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Under the United Nations Charter the Security Council was 
mandated to ensure the maintenance of international peace and 
security. Within the Security Council, the five permanent 
members, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russian 
Federation and China have special veto powers that have enabled 
them to greatly impact the international crisis across the globe. 
During the Cold War, the United States and then Soviet Union 
exercised the veto to enforce their political and ideological will 
rather than to uphold the UN Charter. Several events such as the 
Korean War, the Suez Canal Crisis and the fight for Namibian 
independence were greatly affected by actions taken by the 
Security Council, particularly the permanent five. At the end of the 
Cold War, it appeared as though the division within the Council 
would end. The unification of the Security Council during the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait created hopes that the Council could now 
function as mandated. A unified front from the Council in response 
to the situation in Kuwait brought other questions to the table. 
Should countries such as Germany and Japan be allowed a seat at 
the permanent five table for contributing the majority of the 
financial backing for the Gulf War? Many questions also arose 
about representation within the Council. With no countries from 
Africa or Latin America, UN member countries grew weary of 
adding Japan and Germany to an already unbalanced permanent 
five membership. During the 1990s the United States emerged as a 
hegemonic power, using their political, economic and military 
might to control the actions of the Council. When war broke out in 
Kosovo and Rwanda, the United States was hesitant to involve 
their military in the crisis. Without the backing of the United 
States, the Security Council found it difficult to act. China also 
showed hesitation, as they feared the Council was becoming too 
entangled in the domestic affairs of sovereign nations. With 
regards to collective security, the Security Council lost sense of 
legitimacy by not responding promptly to the situation in Rwanda. 
After the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the foreign policy 
agenda of the United States shifted. The invasion of Afghanistan to 
overthrow the Taliban happened without a Security Council 
resolution that would have legalized the action. This action was 
overlooked by the member nations of the United Nations due to the 
severity of the terror attacks. When the United States and their 
allies believed that Iraq was a threat to international peace and 
security in 2002, the US government attempted to gain support 
from the Security Council but failed. The US circumvented the 
authority of the Council and invaded Iraq against the greater will 
of the international community.  
Introduction 
 
 There are four established rules of global security: War, 
rivalry, collective security and security community. The United 
Nations Security Council was created to act under the arrangement 
of collective security. The UN Charter clearly defines the purpose 
of the international organization in Article I: 
The Purposes of the United Nations are 
“To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to 
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal 
of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of 
aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by 
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice 
and international law, adjustment or settlement of international 
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace”1 
In collective security, participating members are fellow citizens 
where autonomy is limited by obligations to follow and enforce the 
community’s rules. Security is achieved through multilateral 
commitments where members do not break the rules of the 
community and force is at times necessary to enforce the 
established rules.2 The remaining rules of global security have 
shaped and affected decisions and actions within and outside of the 
Security Council since its creation. During the Cold War, The 
United States and the Soviet Union were in a rivalry which led to 
the creation of security communities within a bipolar world. After 
the end of the Cold War, the remaining superpower, the United 
                                                 
1 UN Charter www.un.org 
2 Frederking p. 10 
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States led what some scholars have labeled a hegemonic war 
against states that would otherwise be considered autonomous. 
States that are somewhat powerful within the international system, 
such as the permanent five members of the Security Council, have 
been able to negatively or positively influence international peace 
and security issues. The veto power given to the Security Council 
has been used at times to stop resolutions that otherwise would 
have effectively ended a conflict. Without the involvement of 
outside organizations and other organs within the United Nations, 
many threats to international peace and security may have 
escalated due to the inability of the Permanent Five members to get 
past their political/ideological differences and interests. The veto 
power and the establishment of a permanent membership within 
the Security Council have created a hierarchy within the Council.3 
Because the Council can not act unless all of the permanent five 
members agree, the remaining ten elected members of the Council 
are left without the power to pass resolutions. For the Security 
Council to be more effective, the permanent membership needs to 
be evaluated and reformed. In many case studies, the hindrances of 
the permanent five membership are evident.  
Close analysis of case studies will show the many times the 
Security Council has been ineffective in handling threats to 
international peace and security due to the political agendas of the 
                                                 
3 Frederking p. 24 
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permanent five. Even in cases where the Security Council has 
acted, it has been in the best interest of at least one of the 
permanent five. The veto power allows the Council to enforce the 
rules of collective security on all but the permanent five members. 
In many instances, the veto power has been abused. In other cases, 
due to decisions by members of the permanent five, the Council 
has chosen not to act at all. At times, the more powerful members 
within the Security Council have been able to completely 
circumvent the authority of the council without consequence due to 




























The Creation of the United Nations and the Security Council  
 
  
  In January of 1940, the United States and Great Britain 
began talks on the development of an international organization 
that would ensure the peace and security of the world after the end 
of World War II. Although the United States had not yet entered 
the war, President Franklin D. Roosevelt became one of the main 
advocates for the creation of a new global security organization 
that would succeed. The Atlantic Charter served as a key 
ideological foundation for the principles and norms that would be 
created.  Under the Atlantic Charter, signed by Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt in August 1941, 
preliminary guidelines on a peaceful existence among the 
international community were declared. The Atlantic Charter was 
not a formal treaty between the states but an affirmation in which 
the two states under clause 8 believe. “ …that all of the nations of 
the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to 
the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be 
maintained if land sea and air armaments continue to be employed 
by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of 
their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider 
and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of 
such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all 
other practicable measures which will lighten for peacekeeping 
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peoples the crushing burden of armament.”4 By taking the lead and 
providing an ideological and political basis on the shape of the post 
war world, the United States and Great Britain put themselves at 
the forefront of the creation of the United Nations. On January 1, 
1942, just five months after the creation of the Atlantic Charter, 
The United Nations Declaration was signed not only by Churchill 
and Roosevelt but by Maxim Litvinov of Russia and T.V. Soong of 
China. The following day, representatives of twenty-six nations 
also signed the declaration. The signatories became bound from 
making a separate peace and pledged to the maximum war effort 
with their new allies.  
 The first four signatories of the United Nations Declaration 
would later become known as the Big Three and China as well as 4 
of the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council. In a later 
meeting held in Moscow, October 1943, the commitment among 
these four governments to,”…recognize the necessity of 
establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international 
organization, based on the principle of sovereign equality of all 
peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, 
large and small for the maintenance of international peace and 
security,”5 became even greater. This consensus set the stage for a 
major conference to be held 1944 in Dumbarton Oaks, Washington 
                                                 
4 Atlantic Charter www.archives.gov/education/lessons/fdr-churchill/ 
5 Groom; Taylor and Groom, p. 13 
 5
D.C. This conference allowed the principal sponsors to present a 
unified front and create the basic principles that would later 
become part of the United Nations Charter. The results of the 
conference were circulated for discussion among other nations 
interested in becoming part of the new organization. Within this 
circulatory, the creation of  the Security Council, which would 
consist of five permanent members, those of whom would hold a 
veto power was centered. The approval of the United Nations 
Charter draft was to be discussed at a General Conference in San 
Francisco, April 1945.  
 Fifty countries were represented at the San Francisco 
conference. The Big Three and China, led the meetings with their 
draft from the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations as well as with 
amendments from the Yalta conference held in Moscow. 
Amendments from the fifty participating states were also 
considered. Many of the smaller states feared that they would not 
be fairly represented within the framework of the United Nations. 
When compared with the powers held by the permanent members 
in the Security Council, smaller states were concerned that the veto 
power would serve as a paralyzing obstacle when faced with issues 
important to those who would not have the same voting power.  An 
agenda for smaller powers had been outlined in an earlier 
conference held in the Mexico City meeting of Latin American 
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countries. Their objective was to strengthen the power of the 
General Assembly, which they believed was a more equal 
representation of the international community. The four sponsoring 
powers of the conference; United States, China, Great Britain and 
the Soviet Union, were now referred to as the Big Four and agreed 
that they would not waiver far from what had been agreed upon 
them at Dumbarton Oaks.  The debate by the smaller states over 
the establishment of the Security Council and the veto were at the 
forefront of the controversy. The Big Four made it very clear that 
they would not entertain creating the United Nations without the 
Security Council. The veto was also to be present in the UN 
Charter. For them, it was a “take it or leave it” deal and the smaller 
powers could not afford to “leave it.”  The responses to the issue of 
the veto power were as follows: 
 
“In view of the primary responsibility of the permanent members, 
they could not be expected in the present condition of the world, to 
assume the obligation to act in so serious a matter as the 
maintenance of international peace and security in consequence of 
a decision in which they had not concurred. Therefore, if a 
majority voting in the Security Council is to be made possible, the 
only practicable method is to provide, in respect of non-procedural 
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decisions, for unanimity of the permanent members plus the 
concurring votes of at least two of the non-permanent members.”6 
 
In this statement, the Big Four affirmed their belief that the 
Security Council was the primary organ in maintaining peace and 
security. As the allies and victors of World War II, they believed it 
was their duty to define what standards the international 
community should abide by.  The sponsoring powers did agree for 
a review of the UN Charter within 10 years of the founding of the 
United Nations if requested by two-thirds of the General Assembly 
and seven members of the Security Council. 7 By October 24, 
1945, the United Nations Charter had received the necessary 
ratifications to begin operation and the sponsoring powers were 




“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United 
Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.  





                                                 
6 Goodspeed p.97 
7  Groom; Taylor and Groom p. 18 
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The Security Council and the Cold War 
 
 The united front of the Big Four and now the Permanent 
Five members (with the addition of France) of the Security Council 
began to fade within the first year of the ratification of the UN 
Charter. Differences in ideology between the Western Nations and 
the Soviet Union began to affect the relationship among the P5.  
Iran accused the Soviet Union of unlawful occupation within its 
borders by its soldiers. In a letter to the Security Council in 
January 1946, Iran asked the Council to investigate the Soviet 
Union’s interference and recommend a solution. The Soviet Union 
did not want the issue before the Security Council and requested 
that the matter be handled bilaterally however they did not block it 
from the Council’s consideration by use of its veto power.  After 
the fifth meeting of the Security Council on the matter, a resolution 
was drafted allowing the parties to settle the dispute bilaterally but 
still informing the Council of the progress. This allowed the Soviet 
Union to have complete control over the issue outside of the 
Council. By the second time Iran brought the issue to the Security 
Council, the international climate had changed.  Former Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill had given his Iron Curtain Speech and 
rifts began to form between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. Unanimity was not the outcome of the future meeting on 
the issue of Soviet occupation in Iran. In objection of the Security 
 9
Council taking on the issue, the Soviet Union boycotted 
participation in the Council, the representative stating he wasn’t 
able to participate in discussions because his motion was defeated.8  
 The Iranian dispute was the beginning of a more 
complicated environment within the Security Council. The veto 
power was now being used more as a political tool between 
Eastern and Western ideologies rather than a tool to uphold the 
fundamental founding of the United Nations which was to 
maintain international peace and security. On December 1, 1949, 
the General Assembly passed resolution 290 which is also known 
as the Essentials of Peace. Within the resolution, The General 
Assembly calls upon the five permanent members of the Security 
Council; “To broaden progressively their cooperation and to 
exercise restraint in the use of the veto in order to make the 
Security Council a more effective instrument for maintaining 
peace.”  This resolution developed due to frustrations felt by those 
within the United Nations who believed the P5 were not acting 
responsibly with the powers invested in them by the UN Charter.  
 In 1947 the UN Special Commission on the Balkans 
(UNSCOB) was deployed due to complaints that communist 
movements in northern Greece backed by Soviet satellites such as 
Albania, Yugoslavia and Greece were destabilizing the Greek 
state. This issue was first brought to the Security Council but a 
                                                 
8 Taylor and Groom pp. 71-72 
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resolution on the issue was vetoed by the Soviet Union because it 
was within their sphere of influence. The fall of Greece to a 
communist movement would only strengthen their hold on Eastern 
Europe; therefore, the Soviet Union did not want a formal 
resolution to be passed by the Security Council that would bind 
them to diffuse the conflict. The United States, aware of the 
Soviets’ political agenda, referred the situation to the General 
Assembly whom was able to deploy UNSCOB to the area as an 
observer mission. This was the first fact finding mission deployed 
by the United Nations and it also laid the ground work for General 
Assembly Resolution 377, Uniting for Peace. 9 
Under Resolution 377, the General Assembly would be allowed to 
intervene should the Security Council be unable to act due to a 
veto stalemate, stating;  
“…if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the 
permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security in any case 
where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the 
matter immediately with a view to making appropriate 
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in 
the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of 
armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international 
peace and security…” 10 
 
                                                 
9 Krasno; Cronin and Hurd pp 174-177 
10 Krasno; Cronin and Hurd, p174 
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 The resolution allowed the General Assembly to debate an issue 
of peace and security only if they had the Security Council votes to 
do so and if the majority of UN members also give a consensus by 
votes. Procedural matters, such as this would not be subject to the 
veto in the Security Council therefore prohibiting one of the 
Permanent Five members to block passage due to political 
interests.11  
 These precautionary measures taken by the General 
Assembly reflected the still unsettled feelings the smaller powers 
had about the Security Council from the conference in San 
Francisco. Resolution 377’s first real challenge came when North 
Korea invaded South Korea on June 25th 1950.   
Just nine months after the Communist victory in China, North 
Korea launched an attack on South Korea. Korea thus became the 
first real battleground of the Cold War and the first challenge to the 
auspices of the Security Council. Charged with the duty of 
maintaining international peace and security, the Security 
Council’s ideological differences became evident during the 
Korean War. The United States and its major allies responded 
swiftly and decisively to halt what they perceived to be the 
unlawful expansion of Communism and a violation of the United 
Nations Charter.12  North Korea was a Communist state that 
                                                 
11 Krasno; Cronin and Hurd p. 175 
12 McWilliams and Piotrowski p. 59 
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received substantial Soviet political, economic, and military 
support and was considered by the West, to be under Soviet 
control.13 When the war broke out, the Soviet Union was in the 
middle of protesting its attendance at Security Council meetings. 
The boycott of the Council by the Soviet Union was in response to 
the United Nations not recognizing the new found People’s 
Republic of China, and still allowing the Chiang Kai-shek regime 
in Taiwan to hold its seat within the United Nations and in the 
Security Council. The western allies within the Security Council 
took advantage of the absence of the Soviet Union and gave the 
United States authority to take action against the North Korean 
invasion. Once the Soviet Union learned the plans of the Security 
Council to take decisive action against North Korea, they returned 
to the Council and blocked any further involvement in the region 
by using their veto power. The veto reflected accurately, the 
divided world in which from this point forward it would often be 
used. The great powers would deliberately pursue methods of 
diplomacy based on national power rather than to cultivate high 
principles of international cooperation and tolerance. 14 
 Although the Soviet Union halted any further action by the 
Security Council with regards to Korea when they returned to their 
seat on the Security Council August 1, 1950, The United States, 
                                                 
13 McWilliams and Piotrowski p. 63 
14 Mahbubani p 255 
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France and Great Britain along with their allies had already 
effectively passed Security Council resolutions 82- 85. The 
resolutions condemned the armed aggression by North Korea, 
called for the withdrawal of the troops and gave permission to UN 
member nations to “assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself 
against armed attack and thus restore international peace and 
security in the area.”15  This call for member nations to contribute 
forces to an area of conflict would later be known as “police 
action” to repel aggression. 16 Resolution 83 authorized military 
involvement by the United States and other UN member nations. 
The Soviet Union protested this and called it an act of aggression. 
They contended that the war was started by South Korea and the 
deployment of UN forces in Korea was in violation of the UN 
Charter because neither the Soviet Union or China were present at 
the Security Council meeting to cast a vote.  
Debates in the Security Council over Korea prompted an analysis 
of the UN Charter. It was found that the General Assembly could 
discuss matters of international peace and security if the Security 
Council was not currently debating the matter.17 This particular 
situation prompted the strategic planning by the United States to 
create and implement the Uniting for Peace Resolution 377. 
Members of the General Assembly felt this was a necessary 
                                                 
15 UN Website http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1950/scres50.htm 
16 McWilliams and Piotrowski p. 64 
17 Krasno: Cronin and Hurd  p. 178  
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measure given that the crisis in Korea was definitely a matter of 
peace and security and the main organ charged with its 
maintenance was in an ideological feud. During debates in the 
General Assembly about the issue in September 1950, Ambassador 
of Brazil De Freitas Valle stated, “the right of the veto has been 
abused.”  US Secretary of State Dean Acheson accused the Soviet 
Union of being a main obstacle to peace due to their policies. 
Meanwhile Ambassador Andrei Vyshinsky of the Soviet Union 
accused the United States of having ulterior motives for their 
involvement in Korea stating. “the United States 
delegation…adopted a number of illegal and unjust decisions on 
the Korean question to camouflage the armed intervention in 
Korea.18  
Sixteen UN member Nations ultimately contributed to the UN 
forces in Korea. The bulk of the UN troops, weapons and materials 
were from the United States. The United States also financed a 
huge portion of the operations and the UN forces were placed 
under US command. The military diplomatic planning for the war 
was also done mainly in Washington.19 The swift involvement by 
the UN and particularly the United States was believed to be a 
political maneuver led by the United States to halt the spread of 
Communism throughout Asia. Peace talks began when both sides, 
                                                 
18 Krasno; Cronin and Hurd p. 180 
19 McWilliams and Piotrowski p. 65 
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South Korea supported by the US and North Korea supported by 
China, were stuck in a deadlock in spring 1950. Over the next two 
years, two main questions divided those trying to reach a 
settlement. The first was the cease-fire line and the second was an 
exchange of prisoners.  The talks were being held in Moscow and 
Washington led by Joseph Stalin and Harry S. Truman 
respectively. Due to their differences over matters that stemmed 
deeper than the war in Korea, the two were unable to come to an 
agreement and the issue was not settled until both leaders were no 
longer in office. A final agreement was signed on July 23, 1953 
which made the final battle line the truce line. This came to be 
known as a demilitarized zone, stretching two and half miles wide 
almost at the original 38th parallel line.  
 The struggle within the Security Council over the war in 
Korea during the early years of its existence served as a harbinger 
for years to come. Its effectiveness in the new bi-polar world 
would come into question over the next 40 years. The Security 
Council faced many peacekeeping operational challenges during 
this trying time. During this time period, many cases that would 
have been heard by the Security Council were not considered 
because they could not come to an agreement. Many times, the 
issue was referred to the General Assembly under resolution 377. 
 16
The Uniting for Peace resolution was officially invoked on 1956 























Suez Canal Crisis 
In July 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser, president of Egypt 
seized control of the Suez Canal. The Canal had been controlled 
and protected by the United Kingdom since the Convention of 
Constantinople in 1888 declared the area a neutral zone. Under the 
later Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, the United Kingdom insisted 
upon retaining control of the canal. This was refuted by Egypt for 
several years and British troops finally withdrew from the region in 
1956. Shortly after the withdrawal, Nasser placed control of the 
canal under the Suez Canal Authority. Nasser forbade the use of 
the canal by Israel once it was nationalized. Israel considered this 
an act of war and began talks with the United Kingdom and France 
about planning a counterattack that would retake the Suez Canal.20 
In October 1956, Britain, France and Israel signed the Protocol of 
Sevres, a secret agreement that called for the joint military and 
political efforts of the three nations to retake the Suez Canal from 
Egypt. Following the treaty, Israel attacked in Egypt’s Sinai desert 
and eventually reached the Suez Canal and the southern tip of the 
Sinai. Shortly after, British and French naval, air and land forces 
joined the battle against Egypt. 21 
 Attempts made by the UN Security Council to intervene 
and stop the war were met by French and British opposition. Since 
                                                 
20 Krasno: Cronin and Hurd p.183 
21 McWilliams and Pitrowoski p. 156 
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two of the nations involved in the war were members of the 
Security Council, they used their veto power to halt any 
involvement by the Council in the crisis. In response to the 
stalemate, the Security Council was able to pass resolution 119 
which stated, 
“The Security Council, 
Considering that a grave situation has been created by action 
undertaken against Egypt. 
Taking in to account that the lack unanimity of its permanent 
members at the 749th and 750th meetings of the Security Council 
has prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security,  
Decides to call an emergency special session of the General 
Assembly resolution 377 A (V) of November 1950, in order to 
make appropriate recommendations.” 22 
 
The emergency session of the General Assembly was held 
November 7-10, 1956. The General Assembly demanded the 
immediate withdrawal of Israeli, British and French troops. The 
first deployments of armed UN peacekeepers (United Nations 
Emergency Force; UNEF) were sent to the region to monitor a 
buffer zone between the Egyptian and Israeli troops.23  The Uniting 
for Peace Resolution was successful in ending the conflict with the 
involvement of official UN troops. This was the first time the 
resolution had been used and members of the General Assembly 
                                                 
22 UN website http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/109/53/IMG/NR010953.pdf?OpenElement 
23 Krasno: Cronin and Hurd, p. 183 
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now felt they had some control when threats to international peace 
and security arose and the Security Council was unable to reach 
unanimity.  
 There are several cases throughout the short history of the 
United Nations where the General Assembly had to take some role 
and implementing and passing resolutions that were vital to 
maintaining a war free international environment. One case 
presented not only to the United Nations but to the League of 
Nations is the case of the sovereignty of South West Africa or 
Namibia, as it came to be known.  
 
Namibia  
The region now known as Namibia was a German colony 
until its conquest by South Africa in 1915 during World War 1. At 
the end of the war, the League of Nations entrusted the territory to 
South Africa to help transition the area to a sovereign nation. 
Instead, South Africa continued the harsh discriminatory practices 
of the Germans and encouraged white people to settle on the 
majority of the farmlands. South Africa’s ultimate plan for the 
territory was annexation.24 When the United Nations was formed, 
the Trusteeship Council was created as one of the organs of the 
new organization to oversee the transition of territories to 
independence. South Africa refused to place Namibia into the 
                                                 
24 Thornberry: Malone p.408 
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Trusteeship Council and instead began the process of overtaking 
the region by placing white South West Africans in the parliament 
of South Africa. The General Assembly brought the issue to the 
International Court of Justice in 1949 in attempts to gain legal 
backing and declare South Africa’s actions illegal. The ICJ, 
however, backed the original international mandate that declared 
South West Africa a territory under the Union of South Africa. 
25The Independence movement did not take a strong hold in 
Namibia until the 1960s when several independence organizations 
were formed and the General Assembly became increasingly 
involved. 26 
 The South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) 
and the South West African National Union (SWANU) were 
formed by peoples living within Namibia. These two organizations 
helped keep the movement for independence alive, gaining 
worldwide recognition. SWAPO and SWANU developed key 
relationships with the Organization of African Unity (OAU). OAU 
was established to help unify the African continent and to help 
liberation movements in regions still affected by colonialism. 
Many states that were part of OAU were also members of the 
United Nations. These member nations were able to gather support 
for the Namibian independence movement within the General 
                                                 
25 Krasno; Krasno, Hayes, Daniel p. 32 
26 Krasno: Krasno, Hayes, Daniel p. 28 
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Assembly. The General Assembly granted SWAPO observer status 
in 1973 and later recognized the organization as the sole 
representative of Namibia in 1976. In 1978, SWAPO was given 
permanent observer status and eventually a permanent seat in the 
General Assembly, elevating the organization to a level of 
countries such as Switzerland.  The General Assembly passed a 
resolution that revoked the mandate that gave South Africa control 
over the area and made Namibia the direct responsibility of the 
United Nations. This action by the General Assembly was 
endorsed by the Security Council in resolutions 264 and 269. 
Resolution 264 states, 
“The Security Council  
Taking into account General Assembly resolution 2145….which 
the General Assembly of the United nations terminated the 
Mandate of South West Africa and assumed direct responsibility 
for the Territory until its independence, 
Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to 
freedom and independence in accordance with the provisions of 
General Assembly resolution 1514.  
2. Considers that the continued presence of South Africa in 
Namibia is illegal and contrary to the principles of the Charter and 
the previous decisions of the United Nations and is detrimental to 
the interests of the population of the Territory and those of the 
international community;  
3. Calls upon the Government of South Africa to withdraw 
immediately its administration from the Territory;  
 22
8. Decides that in the event of failure on the part of the 
Government of South Africa to comply with the provisions of the 
present resolution, the Security Council will meet immediately to 
determine upon necessary steps or measures in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”  
 
This resolution endorsement was very significant to the Namibian 
struggle for independence. They finally received the recognition 
necessary to make their ordeal a permanent fixture in international 
debate. Although the Security Council did agree that the presence 
of South Africa in Namibia was illegal, their hands were still tied 
by ideological differences and the veto. When South Africa failed 
to comply with General Assembly and Security Council 
resolutions, the Security Council did not make any mention of 
using Chapter VII in future resolutions which would give the 
Council permission to use force in the matter. The Security 
Council reconvened on the issue in 1976. Three draft resolutions 
were brought forward by members of the nonaligned movement 
that would have imposed mandatory sanctions against South Africa 
for failure to comply with resolution 385. Britain, France and the 
United States cast a triple veto against each resolution. 27 
 The initial General Assembly resolutions, calling for the 
withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia only held moral 
authority without the backing of the Security Council. Unlike the 
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Korean War, the Security Council did not take a defined path with 
South Africa. The Western permanent members of the Security 
Council realized the issue in Namibia wasn’t one they could 
“shelve”, however they were very concerned with the recent 
involvement of China and the Soviet Union in South Africa. Both 
governments were becoming more involved in the economic, 
infrastructural and strategic affairs of the region.28 When West 
Germany and Canada joined the Security Council in 1977, the five 
western nations searched for an independence and peace process 
that would satisfy all members of the Council. They became 
known as the Western Contact Group of Namibia.   
Over the next year, the Western members of the Council drafted a 
program they believed would be acceptable to everyone.  Their 
proposal stated its central feature in addition to resolution 385 
would be the holding of free and fair elections for Namibia as a 
single entity under the supervision and control of the United 
Nations with the assistance of South Africa. This culminated in 
resolution 435 which was passed in September 1978. Resolution 
435 established the United Nations Transition Assistance Group 
(UNTAG) for a period of twelve months. UNTAG’s main 
objective was to assist the Secretary General’s Special 
Representative to carry out the mandate that ensures the early 
                                                 
28 Thornberry; Malone p. 410 
 24
independence of Namibia through free elections under the 
supervision and control of the United Nations.29  
In response to this proposal, many UN members found it difficult 
to understand why South Africa needed to have joint responsibility 
and keep its administration in place during this process.  In their 
defense they said it was a “working arrangement”, and was not to 
constitute the recognition of the South African presence in an 
administration of Namibia.30  
 Despite the Western member’s of the Security Councils 
attempt at trying to come up with an agreeable proposition on 
Namibia, many countries felt that there were more political reasons 
responsible for the delay of executing resolutions that were already 
set in place. During this time, Cuban troops were present in 
neighboring Angola. The Western allies feared that communism 
would spread to Namibia should South Africa be taken out of the 
equation before a stable, democratic government could be 
established in Namibia. The South Africa National party had 
warned their electorate of the growing “encirclement” of southern 
Africa by “international communism.” 31  The West was also afraid 
of SWAPO’s lean towards communism. While the debate over the 
sphere of influence in the region continued, there was mounting 
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international pressure against South Africa in response to the 
discriminatory law of apartheid.  
 South Africa was defiant towards the Security Council and 
its resolutions. The government believed it had options other than 
adhering to resolutions passed by the United Nations. South Africa 
believed that it could (1) militarily defeat SWAPO and its allies in 
Angola, (2) foster a white dominated government structure within 
Namibia that would be accepted by the international community 
and (3) believed that if elections were held immediately, SWAPO 
would win and impose socialist policies.32 While the Jimmy Carter 
administration was in office during the late 1970s, attempts were 
made to draft a bill of rights for Namibia but once he was voted out 
office, this process was put on hold due to Ronald Reagan’s focus 
on the spread of communism his belief that South Africa was an 
ally in containment.33 
 As stated previously, much of the fear about instability in 
the South African region was due to Cuban troops present in 
Angola. These troops were backed by the Soviet Union and in 
1988; they launched an attack against the South African Defense 
Force that resulted in heavy casualties. The presence of conflict 
within Angola delayed the implementation of resolution 435 which 
called for peaceful elections within Namibia.  South Africa 
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continued to use the presence of the Cuban troops within Angola 
as a means to continue their occupation of Namibia. The United 
States along with Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the Soviet 
Union began to hold discussions in 1988 where the parties agreed 
on the necessary steps to prepare the way for the independence of 
Namibia. The Security Council passed resolution 626 which 
created the United Nations Angola Verification Mission 
(UNAVEM). This mission was created to verify the 
implementation of the Angolan-Cuban Accords, which required 
the Cuban military to phase out their presence over a period of 
thirty-one months. South Africa was also required to remove their 
troops from Namibia.  April 1, 1989 became the set date for the 
implementation of resolution 435. 34 
 Martti Ahtisaari, Special Representative of UNTAG, 
arrived in Namibia March 31st to begin the process of preparing 
Namibia for independence. This same day, conflict broke out 
between SWAPO fighters and South African police in the northern 
part of Namibia. It was reported that armed SWAPO had crossed 
the border from Angola, igniting the crisis. The UN had not yet 
deployed its troops or observers therefore the actual source of the 
incident remained debated. The Foreign Minister of South Africa 
threatened to pull out of the independence movement had he not 
been allowed to release the South African Defense Forces. By the 
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time the conflict was over, more than 300 SWAPO members were 
killed. The death toll of the SADF was roughly 30. SWAPO 
(because they were feared to be communist enthusiasts) had not 
been invited to be a part of the negotiations that led to the removal 
of the Cuban troops that opened the door for Namibian 
independence; therefore there was not a formal procedure in place 
that would allow them to disarm peacefully. Resolution 435 called 
for SWAPO to serve as an observer over the Namibian 
independence process once there was a cease-fire. The crisis on 
April 1st could have been avoided if SWAPO had been included in 
the talks at Brazzaville where the agreement on how the Namibian 
independence process would be implemented was established. On 
April 8th, a cease-fire agreement was reached that called for 
members of SWAPO to return to Angola and South African forces 
were required to return to their bases. The fighting ended just a few 
days later allowing UNTAG to continue preparing Namibia for 
independence. 35 
 Elections were held in Namibia from November 7-11, 
1989. SWAPO ended up winning 57% of the vote giving them 
more than half of the elected seats in the new Constituent 
Assembly.  Their many years of depending upon the General 
Assembly and the United Nations for support in their fight against 
unjust occupation had finally come to fruition. It also gave rise to a 
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sense that there is some form of unification within the international 
community when sovereign territories are faced with unlawful 
occupation. The situation in Namibia was easily diffused by 1989 
because it became evident that the Soviet Union was steadily 
losing power. Due to the differences among the P5 during this time 
period, the issue in Namibia took longer to resolve. Had the P5 put 
their ideological differences aside, they could have pushed for 
elections sooner within Namibia and had the power to send UN 
troops to the region to maintain peace if they feared interference 
from Cuban troops in Angola. The end of the Cold War brought 
new challenges to the Security Council. With the Soviet Union no 
longer a threat, the United States took the lead in military and 












The End of the Cold War and the Security Council 
“In a letter dated 24 December 1991, Boris Yeltsin, the President 
of the Russian Federation, informed the Secretary-General that the 
membership of the Soviet Union in the Security Council and all 
other United Nations organs was being continued by the Russian 
Federation with the support of the 11 member countries of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States.”36  
After decades of limited activity by the Security Council, the end 
of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union circa 1990-
1992. witnessed an amazing increase in the number of conflicts 
throughout the world. Numerous crises gave rise to demands for 
military action and particularly for intervention in states without, at 
times, the consent of their governments. During the Cold War, the 
Council passed fifteen resolutions per year where six were vetoed. 
Since 1989, the Council has averaged sixty-four resolutions per 
year with less than one veto per year on average.37 It was thought 
that the end of the Cold War would in fact be a new beginning for 
the Security Council. At an opening meeting in January 1992, the 
British Prime Minister, serving as the president of the Security 
Council that month believing this was a turning point within the 
world stated, “the Council should reaffirm its attachment to the 
principle of collective security, that is preventative action, 
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peacemaking and peacekeeping.” He further stated that “Council 
members should pledge to uphold international peace and security 
through reinforced measures of arms control for which not only the 
Council but also the whole organization had to play an increasingly 
important role.” 38 This statement set precedent on the matters 
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Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait 
 In the summer of 1990, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein 
launched an invasion of neighboring Kuwait and quickly 
conquered the small, almost defenseless oil rich nation. The ruler 
of Kuwait and his family fled to Saudi Arabia as the international 
community watched in horror and disbelief. Four days after the 
invasion, the UN Security Council composed of the P-5,  Canada, 
Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, Finland, Malaysia, 
Romania, Yemen and Zaire, voted (Cuba and Yemen abstaining) 
to impose a worldwide trade embargo against Iraq under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter.39  This was the most comprehensive non-
military sanctions ever imposed by the United Nations.  Within 
four months, the Security Council passed 12 resolutions on the 
issue of Iraq-Kuwait.  Resolution 660, adopted on August 2nd, the 
day of invasion, condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and 
demanded the immediate withdrawal of Iraq. Resolution 678, 
passed on November 29th 1990, demanded the compliance with 
resolution 660. If Iraq did not comply by January 15, 1991, 
resolution 678 authorized member states co-operating with the 
government of Kuwait….to use all necessary means to uphold and 
implement resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions 
and to restore international peace and security to the area.40 
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Resolution 678 was adopted 12 votes to 2 (Cuba and Yemen), 1 
abstention (China).  
President George W. Bush of the United States began building a 
powerful international military coalition with the intentions of not 
only restoring sovereignty to Kuwait but taking Saddam Hussein 
out of power completely. Bush envisioned the United Nations, led 
by the United States, as the guardians of international peace and 
security. With the Soviet Union no longer a contender in leading 
the international community, the United States now saw itself as 
the leader of the free world within the international spectrum. 
When January 15th arrived and Iraq had not withdrawn from 
Kuwait, a thirty-one member coalition descended upon the Gulf 
region. Led by more than 530,000 US, 35.000 Egyptian, 25,000 
British, 22,000 Saudi, 19,000 Syrian and 5,500 French forces, 
totaling nearly 700,000 troops.41 This act of collective security by 
UN member nations provided a breakthrough in global governance 
that finally validated the UN Charter and its effectiveness with 
regards to the UN Security Council.  On March 3, 1991, Iraqi 
foreign minister Tariq Aziz, present at the United Nations, stated 
that Saddam Hussein accepted the UN terms for a cease-fire and 
agreed to withdraw his troops from Kuwait. Iraq had suffered 
many casualties in the war and couldn’t afford any more attacks 
from the onslaught of air strikes from the coalition.  
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The Gulf War and the response of the international community, 
serves as interesting case study for the effectiveness of collective 
security. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the UN Security Council 
adopted resolutions that called for member states to remove 
Hussein’s troops from Kuwait by all means necessary but not all 
members were able to fully participate in this procedure once 
January 15th approached. It was evident that the collective use of 
armed force, as mandated under Article 42 of the UN Charter, was 
not achievable. Members drew the conclusion that all were not 
equipped to carry out such an operation.  The United States and 
other major powers argued that the UN lacked the military and 
logistical capacity to carry out the operation in Iraq. Only 5 
members states were able to send troops and only a handful of 
other countries financed the war.  Surprisingly, the militarily 
power, the United States, did not have to carry the entire cost of 
the war. For the first time, a superpower sought contributions from 
other nations to pay for a military operation it had already 
undertaken. Several Gulf nations and wealthy nonparticipants 
(Germany and Japan) ended up paying nearly the entire bill.42 The 
burden of responsibility for this massive shortcoming of collective 
participation to enforce collective security had to be supported by 
the leading political, financial and military leaders of the United 
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Nations.43 This in fact made the Security Council less involved in 
the actual outcome of the Gulf War. Japan and Germany were not 
members of the Security Council yet they provided the most 




















                                                 
43 Dedring; Taylor and Groom p. 84 
 35
El Salvador 
The United Nations Security Council along with the 
Secretary General played a more equal role in bringing peace to 
the war torn nation of El Salvador in the 1990s. Although the 
conflict in El Salvador had been going on for quite some time, the 
Cold War had delayed the Security Council’s involvement in the 
region. The first collective effort to bring about peace to the war 
torn country was made by the Contadora Group; Colombia, 
Mexico, Panama and Venezuela. This group was later joined by 
the Support Group which included Argentina, Brazil, Peru and 
Uruguay. Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela would later play a 
key role in the peace negotiating process as they served as part of 
the “Group of Friends” to the Secretary General. The Contadora 
Group would become known as creating a political climate for a 
consensus of peaceful resolutions to the conflict in Central 
America. Although the United Nations had formally seized of the 
situation in El Salvador in 1981, they did not become fully 
involved until after he Esquipulas II agreement was created in 
1987.  
In 1987, the president of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias along 
with the other five current Central American Presidents, signed the 
“Procedure for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in 
Central America otherwise called the Esquipulas II agreement in 
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Guatemala. This treaty was a major breakthrough in the region and 
showed the commitment and resolve of those nations in bringing 
about peace even without the official help and support of the 
United Nations. Through this treaty, dialogue on the issues was 
promoted and by July 1989 had received “firm support” from the 
Security Council.44  Resolution 637 adopted by the Security 
Council commended the Central American presidents as they 
expressed their desire for peace and gave the Secretary-General 
their full support to continue his mission in helping the region 
achieve their goals. Security Council involvement remained 
limited on the issue.  
The Esquipulas initiative created political momentum but it 
failed to include the issue of the rebel groups such as the 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) of El 
Salvador. The agreement was created by governments to 
strengthen the political system without opening it up for 
negotiations. One objective of the agreement was to dispel of 
insurgent forces which would include the FMLN.  The United 
Nations was able to help on this gap in the peace process. 
Secretary-General Representative Alvaro de Soto called for a 
meeting in September 1989 with the FMLN and newly elected 
President of El Salvador, Alfredo Cristiani. These initial talks 
failed and violence erupted shortly after. The violence culminated 
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when Jesuit priests, a housekeeper and her daughter were brutally 
murdered in November of that year, it was evident that a different 
approach needed to be taken in El Salvador. In the weeks 
following de Soto feverishly held talks with the FMLN and the 
Salvadoran government trying to find a solution. On April 4th, 
1990, the two sides met in Geneva and along with the Secretary-
General Cuellar, signed an agreement that would guide peace talks 
over the next two years. 45 During this time period, the Secretary-
General’s Group of Friends along with the United States would 
help create the environment for a peaceful resolution outside of the 
Security Council.  
The concept of the Group of Friends was officially 
established during the peace talks in Central America. The idea of 
drumming up support for the Secretary-General was first observed 
under Dag Hammarskjold during the Suez Canal crisis. The Group 
is usually made up of three to six member states and serves as 
support to the Secretary-General in finding peaceful solutions to 
crises.  Secretary General Cuellar’s Group of Friends consisted of 
Colombia, Mexico, Spain and Venezuela. The United States was 
later considered the fifth to the group becoming known as the 
“Four Plus One.” In El Salvador, the Group of Friends was used to 
offset the political weight of the Security Council. Members of the 
Security Council at the time were known to either take the side of 
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FMLN or the Salvadoran government. They were not believed to 
be impartial therfore ineffective at fostering negotiations. 
Particularly, the United States supported the current government of 
El Salvador whereas FMLN received support from the Soviet 
Union and Cuba. The Friends were to maintain impartiality and 
keep the peace process on the right track and focused on the issue 
at hand. Impartiality is a key component for the success of 
mediation, without it parties involved in the conflict may feel as 
though they are not being treated fairly. They could decide that 
returning to fighting may serve their interest better. This was a 
very delicate yet extremely important task for the member states of 
the Group of Friends involved.   
As FMLN and the Salvadoran government came close to an 
agreement in December 1991, talks began to break down and the 
Group of Friends alerted Secretary-General Cuellar. The events 
took place on December 31, 1991, Cuellar’s final day in office. 
They reminded Cuellar that he was responsible for the success of 
the peace process and encouraged him to take action immediately. 
The Friends then pressured the two sides to reach an agreement, 
emphasizing that their window of opportunity was closing with 
Ceullar and his support leaving office. FMLN and the government 
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of El Salvador worked to reach a truce and finally signed the peace 
agreement a little after midnight on January 1, 1992. 46 
 After the official signature of the Peace Accord in Mexico 
on January 16, 1992, the Security Council involvement in El 
Salvador evolved.  The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador 
(ONUSAL) was created as an international authority ensuring 
compliance with the agreement between the two parties before the 
cease fire was set in place but now became active.  Its job was to 
report the progress in El Salvador to the Security Council from 
1992 to 1995.  Its first component, the human rights division, 
served to alleviate the affects of war on the civilian population. 
This was the first time a UN human rights operation served such a 
vast territory over a prolonged period of time. ONASUL included 
380 military observers, 631 police monitors and an electoral 
division. The observer mission played an important part in keeping 
the process on track, demobilizing FMLN and creating trust among 
the people of El Salvador. The creation of the Truth and Ad Hoc 
Commissions also played a vital role in helping the two parties 
come to a resolution on many of the atrocities committed by the 
Salvadoran government before Cristiani took office. The Security 
Council was persistent in making sure the commission produced 
results. The Truth Commission’s report described extreme human 
rights violations and named individuals responsible. The findings 
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heightened tensions and the Legislative Assembly had to be called 
in for an emergency session to grant amnesty before conflict arose.  
 The most serious violation, as described by the Security 
Council, during the transition to peace occurred in May 1993. 
FMLN stock piles of weapons had accidently exploded in 
Nicaragua causing concern to all those involved in the peace 
process. The FMLN was waned that unless they agreed to allow 
the UN inspect and remove remaining weapons, the entire peace 
process could be in jeopardy. The FMLN acted positively to the 
Security Council’s recommendation and allowed ONUSAL’s 
special observers to areas identified by FMLN as places of interest. 
The incident had been diffused successfully and the new Secretary-
General Boutros-Ghali stated that this was an indication of the 
strength in the peace process.  
 In March 1994, El Salvador finally held its first election 
since the cease-fire. FMLN was allowed to participate as a 
legitimate political party for the first time as ONUSAL observed 
the elections and supported the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in the 
registration and the delivery of voter cards. Violent incidents broke 
out at the beginning of the electoral campaign in which, two 
FMLN leaders and several other politicians were murdered. This 
raised fear among the people that the country was not yet safe. The 
Secretary-General and the Security Council acted quickly. They 
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instructed the human rights division of ONUSAL to work with the 
Salvadoran government to find those responsible for the 
disturbances. The findings were to be brought before the Security 
Council.  After the elections, the new administration of President 
Calderon Sol and the FMLN announced their commitment to the 
continued peace. ONUSAL had enabled the Security Council to 
monitor compliance continuously and effectively through the 
transitional period. The United States, Spain and Venezuela, 
members of the Security Council and former members of the 
Group of Friends Plus One made the issue in El Salvador an 
important one on their agenda.47 This active Council involvement 
was driving force behind the peace process and set the stage for a 
better future for the people of El Salvador.   
 The success of the Security Council in diffusing threats to 
international peace and security escalated after the Cold War, 
however, the decade following this event was plagued by a number 
crisis in which the Security Council failed to handle situations 
correctly. One of the most infamous cases is the genocide of 
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Rwanda 
In October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 
invaded Rwanda from Uganda. Both the presidents, Rjuvenal 
Habyarimama of Rwanda and Yoweri Museveno of Uganda were 
at the United Nations headquarters in New York at the time. 
Habyarimama believed that the invasion was sponsored by Uganda 
rather than a rebellion by the Rwandan Tutsi who were present in 
the Ugandan army and targeted the Hutus. Rather than bring the 
issue directly to the Security Council. Habyarimama went to 
France and Belgium for help and advice. France was one of their 
long time allies and Belgium their former colonial ruler.  Unlike 
the rapid and strong response given by the Security Council when 
Iraq invaded Kuwait two months prior, the situation in Rwanda 
wasn’t given that much attention. There are many theories as to 
why the Security Council did not immediately draft a resolution 
pertaining to the invasion. Many contribute this lackadaisical 
response by the Council, as a direct indicator of the national 
interests of the Permanent Five. Due to Rwanda’s minimal export 
commodities that influence the world economy, it was considered 
low on the totem pole of international affairs. The fact that African 
nations are not represented in the P5 has also been attributed to the 
noninterest in the conflict. As stated previously, the Rwandan 
invasion also happened when the Security Council was engulfed in 
 43
the crisis in the Gulf region. As the crisis progressed over the next 
four years, Somalia and Bosnia were also added to the agenda of 
the Security Council. Their resources were being spread extremely 
thin in the post Cold War environment.   
 The Security Council did not place Rwandan on its agenda 
until March 1993 with resolution 812 under the condition that the 
RPF and the Rwandan government continued peace talks. By the 
time the Security Council became involved, the nation had been in 
conflict for over two years and organizations such as the 
Organization of African Unity (OAS) and states such as France 
and Belgium were already actively involved in trying to bring the 
two sides to the table for negotiation. Because the Security Council 
believed there was already a sufficient amount of support in the 
region, they waited on the sidelines to see how the situation would 
progress. Once the Security Council believed a cease-fire was 
being considered, and from the push of one of the P5, France, to 
put the situation on the agenda, the Council finally conceded. 
Resolution 812 called for a deployment of UN observers to the 
Rwanda-Uganda border, possible support to OAU, who were 
monitoring the cease fire agreed upon the Arusha Peace Accord, 
and established an international force for humanitarian assistance 
and civilian protection. 48  What was eventually established by 
Resolution 846 was the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-
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Rwanda (UNOMUR) for a sixth month time period. UNOMOUR’s 
function was to watch the border on the Uganda side to verify that 
no military assistance reached Rwanda. Later that year, in October 
1993, the Council also passed resolution 872 which established the 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda, (UNAMIR). 
UNAMIR was also created for six months upon which time the 
Council would review its progress as well as the situation between 
RPF and the Rwanda government. Both missions’ success was 
contingent upon a peaceful environment within Rwanda. Unaware 
that violence was on the verge of escalating, the Council did not 
recognize that their limited role in giving the two missions enough 
financial and personnel support, they were destined to fail.  
  During the Rwandan crisis, the Security Council received 
reports from the Secretariat, headed by then Secretary-General 
Boutros-Ghali. The Secretariat failed to provide strategic options 
for the Council due to a dynamic referred to as “anticipatory-veto.” 
The close and informal relationship between the Security Council 
and the Secretariat created an unspoken rule in which the 
Secretariat was to discern what the Council was likely to accept 
and to prepare policy options based on the assumption. The reports 
were generally of poor quality with little analysis of the core issues 
and events and eager to report good news because the presence of 
UNAMIR and UNMOUR in Rwanda were based on the belief that 
 45
the situation was improving. Once violence began to erupt, instead 
of engaging the UN with greater determination, the Council 
threatened to pull out UNAMIR unless the two parties adhered to 
the Arusha Peace Accord and maintain the cease-fire.  
 On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana’s plane was shot 
down. Following this tragic event, violence escalated. Ten Belgian 
peacekeepers were killed and the Security Council started to 
discuss the withdrawal of UNAMIR. Some elected members on the 
Security Council at the time, such Nigeria called for an increase in 
troop support but United States, still recovering from an 
unfavorable outcome in their involvement in Somalia, decided 
against further commitment. By the send of April, when it was 
evident that genocide was occurring, the Council still could not 
reach an agreement on how to approach the crisis. As thousands of 
Rwandans were being killed, the Council debated a military 
approach. According to Colin Keating, the elected representative 
of New Zealand on the Security Council during the genocide in 
Rwanda; 
 “One of the key reasons why the troops and resources never came 
together and the military plan was never finalized was because the 
Security Council was unable to show the leadership expected of it. 
Normally the Security Council is the focus of collective leadership. 
It decides to act. That decision constitutes a call to the member 
states to exercise collective security responsibilities. In May and 
June 1994, because of the threatened US veto, the Council was not 
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able to agree to deploy. That signal and lack of leadership were 
anything but a call to act, and as a result member states also held 
back.”49 
  
 Elected members of the Security Council during the 
Rwandan crisis such as New Zealand, Czechoslovakia, Spain, 
Djibouti and Nigeria, were willing to send aid to the region but 
unfortunately did not have the diplomatic, military, and financial 
resources necessary to move forward.  With the proper support, 
these nations could have acted as a safety net in situations where 
the P5 did not want to take on situations where it was a low 
priority for them but important to those people and nations 
affected. Another key factor in the slow reaction by the Security 
Council to engage was due to the fact that in the General Assembly 
had recently elected Rwanda to the Council in January 1994, just 
four months proper to the escalation of violence. If anyone should 
have alerted the Council to the deteriorating situation in Rwanda, it 
should have been their elected official. In this same month, an alert 
was sent from Kigali to New York from UNAMIR Force 
Commander General Romeo Dallaire warning about an imminent 
threat of genocide. The Secretariat received the notice but never 
shared it with the Council. According to Colin Keating, it was later 
revealed that the Rwandan government, led by the Hutu, wanted 
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the Arusha Peace Accord to fail. With the information from their 
insider on the Security Council, they knew that if the peace did not 
last, the United Nations would pull out its forces, paving the way 
for them to take control and eliminate members of the RPF and the 
civilian Tutsi people.  
 New Zealand and the other E10, willing to send troops and 
support to Rwanda were faced with many road blocks from 
members of the P5. Although it was clear that genocide was in fact 
most definitely occurring according to many Non-Governmental 
Agencies (NGOs) that were on the ground in Rwanda at the time, 
they still had difficulty in labeling the massacres taking place as 
genocide. The E10 believed by revealing that genocide was taking 
place would rally international support to keep UNAMIR in place 
and increase its forces within Rwanda. This strategy was met with 
opposition especially from the United States who had opted not to 
become involved in the Genocide Convention for many years. The 
US government feared the use of the word “genocide” could have 
increased domestic and international as well as legal pressure for 
intervention to stop the havoc.50 China was also opposed to the 
introduction of any human rights language in the Security Council 
due to political backlash it could receive for practices within their 
own country.  Ibrahim A. Gambari, the Nigerian Security Council 
representative, believed, “Without a doubt it was the Security 
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Council, especially its most powerful members, as well as the 
international community as a whole, that failed the people of 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 The end of the Cold War marked the dissolution of many of 
the Soviet Union’s satellite states. With their newfound 
independence, the new states were eager to finally have 
sovereignty and with that self determination. The territory known 
as Yugoslavia had remained neutral under leader Josip Tito during 
the Cold War. Under Tito, there were eight ethnic regions; six 
republics; Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia), Croatia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia and two autonomous 
provinces within Serbia: Kosovo and Vojvodina. Josip Tito had 
established a federation where no one people would dominate the 
other, even the numerically and historically dominant Serbs.  
After Tito’s death in 1980, the new Communist party leader 
Slobodan Milosevic sought a greater Serbia dominating the other 
nationalities. In June 1989, Milosevic led a Serb demonstration 
consisting of 1 million people in Kosovo commemorating the 600th 
anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo field. In this battle the Muslim 
Turks had defeated the Christian Orthodox Serbs. Milosevic used 
this day to fuel the division among the people of Yugoslavia. He 
believed it was time for the Serbs to regain control of the region.  
 Starting in June 1991, with Slovenia, each of the regions began to 
secede from Yugoslavia. On one hand, they feared the new policies 
of Milosevic but they were also inspired by the independence 
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movements within the former Soviet Union and demanded more 
autonomy. Although many of the Yugoslavs were of Slavic origin, 
their differences stemmed from religious influences. The Slovenes 
and Croats in the west had fallen  under Roman Catholicism 
whereas the Slavs in the east which included the Serbians and 
Macedonians, belonged to the Eastern Orthodox Church. The 
Albanians and Bosnians were heavily influenced by the Turks and 
therefore had a large Muslim population.52 As the regions seceded, 
bloody conflicts broke out. As a result the United Nations started 
to send peacekeeping troops to the region. As the European 
Community began to recognize each as an independent state, 
Germany the first to recognize Slovenia and Croatia in 1992, it 
became more evident that the developments were now gathering 
the attention of the international community.   
The population in Bosnia was 92% Slavic origin with 44% 
of them Muslim, 31% Orthodox Serbs and 17% Catholic Croats.  
The Bosnian Serbs were not pleased with being a minority within 
their new state and boycotted the referendum on independence 
held in February of 1992. By the end of March, war erupted 
between the Croat forces supported by the Muslim militia and the 
Serb paramilitaries. After the European Community officially 
recognized Bosnia on April 6, 1992, the war intensified with the 
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Serb forces securing control over more than 60% of the new 
republic.53  
 The Security Council did not become involved in the 
Bosnian war until late summer 1992. With peacekeepers already 
present in neighboring Croatia, the Council was reluctant to put 
more resources into the region. Resolution 776, extended the 
already established UN Protection Force (UNPREFOR) within 
Croatia to Bosnia. The main objective of this mission was to 
relieve human suffering, assist the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), contain the conflict to the territories of the 
former Yugoslavia, and facilitate the efforts to reach a peaceful 
settlement. The members of the Council were at first determined 
not to be drawn in to the war but as time progressed and the 
situation worsened, the United Kingdom and France thought 
enforcement was necessary. UNPROFOR remained a 
peacekeeping mission, ill equipped for the dangerous environment.   
Eventually safe areas within in Bosnia were established by 
Security Council Resolution 836 in June 1993. These areas 
included the towns of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and 
Srebrenica. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNPROFOR 
was given the permission to deter attacks against the safe areas. 
The resolution also allowed member states, “acting nationally or 
though regional organizations may take under the authority of the 
                                                 
53 Berdal p. 453 
 52
Security Council, all necessary measures, through the use of air 
power to support UNPROFOR in carrying out its mandate. These 
safe areas were also meant to further support a “lift and strike” 
policy being pushed by the United States.  
 The lift and strike policy called for a partial lifting of the 
arms embargo that was applied against the Bosnian government 
combined with target air strikes on Bosnian Serb strongholds. The 
lifting of the embargo would also make arms available to the 
Bosnian Muslim population who were at a disadvantage. The 
Bosnian Serbs were heavily supported by Slobodan Milosevic who 
was interested in protecting the Serbian Orthodox minority with in 
Bosnia. Milosevic provided weapons to the Serbian militia who 
eventually seized Sarajevo. This effort to halt the Bosnian Serbs by 
creating safe areas ran in to difficulties as member states failed to 
come through on their promise of troops.  Increasing tensions 
among the Council members led to a failed attempt to align things 
on the ground and successfully provide the support needed.  The 
United States, usually in alignment with their western counterparts, 
disagreed with sending troops in to the region. During his 
campaign, Bill Clinton promised tough military action against the 
Bosnian Serbs but when finally faced with sending troops, it 
became a challenge due to the political and domestic backlash due 
to the recent killings of American soldiers in Somalia  fall 1993.  
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This stance taken by the US government caused tension on the 
Security Council. Being in “politically” and out “military” made it 
difficult for progress to be made. The UK had come to provide the 
largest number of peacekeeping troops on the ground with France 
not far behind. Russia played middle of the road during the crisis. 
Due to the recent fall of the Soviet Union, Russia wanted to 
maintain its spot in the Security Council and saw it necessary to 
take diplomatic actions that were more conducive to keep them in 
“good standing” at the decision table. Russia desired to keep its 
great power status among the permanent five and become a 
constructive partner of the West.  China chose to approach the 
Bosnian war in a completely different manner. Abstaining on the 
majority of the resolutions taken on the crisis, China felt the 
Security Council and the United Nations as a whole was becoming 
too involved in the domestic affairs of states. Chinese policy 
conformed to a pattern of cautious, coherent dissent on particular 
issues, such as the use of force, humanitarian intervention and the 
setting up of tribunals. China’s course of actions were to show its 
disproval  of what is considered the erosion, supported by Western 
countries, of key Charter principles, namely, the nonintervention in 
the internal affairs of member states.54  
 While the member states of the United Nations and the 
Security Council quarreled over how to deal with the Bosnian 
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crisis, Serbs established concentration camps and undertook 
“ethnic cleansing.” The Muslim population was targeted and in 
addition to the mass murders taking place, a series of rapes, 
tortures and deportations of civilians accompanied the brutality. In 
the early summer of 1992, the United States had gathered evidence 
of the atrocities occurring but yet and still, the Security Council 
was hesitant in taking enforcement action. American spy satellites 
revealed in the northern town of Brcko, Serbs had herded 3,000 
Muslims into a warehouse, tortured and then murdered them. In 
July 1995, the Serbs massacre of the Muslims continued, this time 
proven with photographs taken by American spy planes of mass 
graves. In Srebrenica, 6,000 to 8,000 Muslim boys and men were 
slaughtered. At this time, it became more difficult for the United 
Nations and NATO to stand by and do nothing but the war had 
already raged on for three years.  
 The situation in Bosnia didn’t come to an end until a 
number of significant events occurred that lead to a cease-fire. The 
first was the success of the Croat military in altering the strategic 
predicament of the Bosnian Serbs. Second was the withdrawal of 
UNPROFOR troops from vulnerable spots where they had been 
subject to the Bosnian Serb forces. British and French Rapid 
Reaction Forces were deployed, supplying mortar and military 
support near Sarajevo and following the London conference in July 
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1995, arrangements for the use of NATO air power in support of 
UN forces were made. The NATO led air campaign became 
known as Operation Deliberate Force. This was a huge change in 
the former approach by the member states in Bosnia. During the 
previous three years, the UN forces looked to maintain its 
neutrality and impartiality to both of the warring parties. By 
October 1995, all three parties involved in fighting, the Bosnian 
Serbs, Bosnian Muslims and Croat forces grew weary and agreed 
to a cease-fire. The Dayton Agreement held in Dayton, Ohio, 
November 1995, divided Bosnia between a Serbian controlled 
Serbian Republic and the Bosnian Federation which consisted of 
the Croats and Muslims. In the view of many, this outcome, paved 













 The Dayton Accords of 1995 divided Bosnia in to two 
republics. The Bosnian Muslims hoped that the partition would not 
be an option because in doing so it sent a signal of appeasement 
towards Serbian aggression and ultra nationalism. The split was 
thought to have rewarded the Serbian tactics. During the accords, 
Kosovo was also addressed. The autonomy was not restored to the 
Kosovars and they were left under the relentless rule of Milosevic. 
Kosovo was 90% Albanian but ruled by the Serbs, a minority in 
the overall population. The Kosovo civilians were treated unfairly 
by the Serb police. This treatment gave rise to the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA). KLA gunmen killed Serbian policemen, 
giving rise to a violent counterattack by the Milosevic regime. The 
KLA launched a major offensive, seizing 40%  of Kosovo. They 
were eventually pushed back brutally by the Yugoslav army and 
Serb paramilitary forces that in turn, shelled, looted and burned 
entire Kosovo villages, displacing hundreds of thousands of 
people. 55 
 The Security Council demanded that the former Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) “cease all action by the security 
forces affecting the civilian population and order the withdrawal of 
security units used for civilian repression.” In resolution 1160, the 
Security Council also condemned the actions of KLA in what they 
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referred to as “terrorist activity”  which included, finance, arms 
and training.  On resolution 1160, all 15 members voted in 
agreement. This resolution focused more on the human rights 
violations, fact finding,  barred states from selling arms To FRY 
and called for a peaceful political process to help end the fighting.   
In September 1998, resolution 1199 was passed. This resolution 
established the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission, called upon 
the authorities of the FRY and the KLA leadership to engage in 
dialogue and to take steps to improve the humanitarian situation. 
The resolution also requested that the representatives of foreign 
states and international institutions be given free movement within 
the territory so that they may monitor the compliance of foretasted 
resolutions  On this resolution Russia chose to abstain.  
 The Contact Group for the Balkans consisted of the United 
States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Russia. The 
group includes four of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council and the countries that provide the largest amount of 
peacekeeping troops in the Balkans. It is essentially an informal 
group that convened to discuss to coordinate international policy 
initiatives in Southeastern Europe. On October 1, 1998, the 
Contact Group met in London concerning Kosovo. In this meeting 
the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov made it clear that Russia 
would veto any UN Security Council resolution seeking to 
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authorize the use of force within Kosovo.  The other Contact 
Group members drew the conclusion that the Kosovo situation 
would have to be handled outside of the Security Council.  
 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military 
planners had been kept abreast of the situation in Kosovo for quite 
some time and had already begun drafting up military option plans. 
On October 13, 1998, the NATO Council authorized activation 
orders to prepare for strikes against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. In attempts to persuade Milosevic to cooperate and try 
to bring about a peaceful solution to the crisis, NATO hoped the 
leverage of military action would influence his decisions. The 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
established the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) to monitor 
compliance and refugee situation on the ground. NATO also would 
establish an aerial surveillance. A few days later, the Security 
Council endorsed the agreements reached in resolution 1203. 
Russian and China chose to abstain from this resolution.  
 Between the implementation of KVM and the endorsement 
of the involvement of NATO by the UN Security Council, the 
situation in Kosovo deteriorated. Two hundred thousand people 
remained displace and forty-five Albanians were murdered in 
Racak. The United States and Russian foreign ministers demanded 
that FRY comply with the Security Council resolutions and that 
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KLA cease fighting. Through the first weeks of February 1999, the 
Contact Group sought to negotiate an agreement that would 
confirm Yugoslav Serb sovereignty, provided greater autonomy for 
Kosovo and introduced an international military presence for 
security.  While the Contact Group attempted to broker a favorable 
peace agreement, the Security Council sought to extend the UN 
Preventive Deployment in Macedonia (UNPREDEP). UNPREDEP 
was established by resolution 983 passed by the Security Council 
in 1995. Its main purpose was to protect the sovereignty, 
international integrity and independence of Macedonia. This 
mission was originally UNPROFOR was set to expire on 
November 30, 1995. Resolution 1186 would have extended 
UNPREDEP but its renewal was vetoed by China due to 
Macedonia’s recent diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.   
 This uncertainty of political motives within the Security 
Council, left a great level of uncertainty of how effective they 
could be within Kosovo. With China and Russia vetoing 
resolutions for more political reasons rather than humanitarian, 
NATO soon stepped in to oversee the mission in Kosovo. In March 
1999, FRY military operations affecting Kosovo civilians 
intensified and the KVM’s ability to function had ended. The 
mission was withdrawn. Following this and the official report of 
KVM verifying an increase in humanitarian catastrophe, NATO 
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commenced air strikes on March 24th which continued for seventy-
seven days. In front of the Council the day following the first air 
strikes, The United Kingdom’s permanent representative 
characterized NATO’s actions as legal. The Canadian 
representative Robert Fowler stated, “ We simply cannot stand by 
while innocents are murdered, and an entire population is 
displaced…because the people concerned do not belong to the 
“right” ethnic group.”56   
 Russia attempted to stop NATO’s action in Kosovo just 
two days after the start of the air strikes. This resolution was 
defeated 12 to 3, within the Security Council. Russian, China and 
Namibia voted in favor of the resolution. The Security Council 
thereby effectively condoned the actions of NATO within Kosovo. 
NATO felt they had a moral responsibility to stop the ethnic 
cleansing and that they also had a legal basis supported by the 
several resolutions already passed on Kosovo by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII. Russia had been warned by Canadian 
ambassador Vitaly Churkin not to block military involvement in 
response to the humanitarian crisis prior to NATO’s involvement. 
NATO circumnavigated the Security Council and began the 
airstrikes. The attempt to later stop NATO by Russia had failed. 57   
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 NATO expansion in to the former Warsaw Pact countries 
threatened Russian security interests and harmed its status and 
prestige. The use of force in Kosovo served as a turning point. 
Most Russians concluded that this acct illustrated American 
imperial ambitions. Russia also believed that American 
marginalization of international institutions and the presence of 
American military bases in its periphery threatened its security.58   
 Russia eventually tried another tactic of bringing the 
NATO strikes to an end by calling for a meeting of the Group of 
Eight or G8 in April 1999. The G8 was originally formed in 1975 
by France. It is a group of industrialized nations. Russia was not 
admitted until 1997. The G8 group was smaller than the Security 
Council but larger than the Contact Group. The G8 offered 
advantages as a forum for negotiations. It was far from the media 
spotlight and had less outside influence. Russia may have begun to 
feel a division among the P5 and preferred to meet with the 
representatives of the United States, Canada, Germany, Japan, 
Italy, the United Kingdom and France on a more informal setting.  
In the G8 there was no voting, no veto and no formal negotiating 
hierarchy. The G8 met on and off for two months working on a 
solution that would be satisfactory to all parties involved.  
After extensively reworking a Russian draft, an agreement was 
reached on the text. The foreign ministers of the G8 agreed on the 
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transmission of the Kosovo mission back to the United Nations and 
jointly NATO, signature of a military-technical agreement by the 
Serbs and NATO, Serb withdrawal, verification of their 
withdrawal, suspension of the NATO air campaign and the entry 
into Kosovo of a coalition of ground forces.  When the resolution 
was approved and signed off by the G8 ministers, it was made 
clear that the permanent representatives of the G8 countries on the 
Security Council were not to alter one word. The final decision on 
how to approach the situation within Kosovo was decided outside 
of the Security Council and among those countries with strong 
economies and military presence. Once the resolution reached the 
Council, China insisted on minor amendment but the resolution 
1244 was approved and passed.59 The solution finally had the 
entire support of the United Nations including Russia and China. 
The parties feuding within Kosovo did not challenge its legitimacy. 
The ethnic cleansing was stopped, the economy restarted, refugees 
returned home and a future for a better life with Kosovo was 
established.  
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Security Council Reform 
 The involvement of the G8 in the Kosovo war brings some 
questions to the forefront about the effectiveness of the Council as 
it currently exists. In recent years, Germany and Japan have come 
to the forefront during several international crises. Their ability to 
finance the Gulf War in 1992 made it evident that the permanent 
five members were either not capable or willing to fund the war. 
Out of the five members, only three, United States, United 
Kingdom and France provided troops. Neither China nor Russia 
provided military or a significant amount of financial backing. 
Since 1992, Japan and Germany increasingly stressed their 
“willingness” to become permanent members of the Security 
Council. The George H.W. Administration favored a permanent 
membership for Germany and Japan. Subsequently, President Bill 
Clinton adopted this same stance pointing to their “record of 
constructive global influence and their capacity to sustain heavy 
global responsibilities.” The United States regarded both states as 
economically potent Western democracies that it expects 
substantially to share the burden the United States has to carry in 
the post-Cold War world. The only way the United States would 
agree to expanding the P5 was with the inclusion of Germany and 
Japan. The US would agree to the expansion also to include 
 64
developing countries but opposed the idea of granting a developing 
country the right of the veto.60  
 The United Kingdom and France were a bit more reluctant 
to accept the idea of additional members within the Security 
Council. They were especially reluctant about giving Germany a 
seat in the P5. They feared relative loss of global power and an 
increase in Germany’s regional influence in Europe as exacerbated 
by the unification of the state following the decades after World 
War II. However, after Germany as well as Japan proved to be 
indispensible allies due to their financial stout, they became 
stronger supporters. China however, wanted the Council to be 
more representative of developing countries and felt the addition of 
Germany and Japan would lead to an imbalance of power. Russia 
only made mention of India being a strong contender as a member 
of the P5.  
 The UN Millennium Declaration published in September of 
2000, contained conflicting views about the expansion of the 
Security Council and particularly the permanent five. All 
governments appeared to support the enlargement of the Council in 
the category of nonpermanent members. There was not a 
consensus on size but there was a call to reform the 
representativeness and the effectiveness of the Council. When it 
came to the expansion of the permanent five, many objected in 
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increasing the number. Also part of the debate was the support of 
the addition of two more Western democracies to the Security 
Council, Japan and Germany, as oppose to the addition of states 
from Latin American, Asian and African countries whom were 
underrepresented. The Security Council already comprised of three 
Western democracies, it didn’t seem fair to add more of the same. 
It is evident that membership within the Security Council’s 
permanent five would only favor the addition of those members 
who would be able to financially or militarily support any tasks 
taken upon by the United Nations.  
In its bid for P5 status, Germany favored the inclusion of up to 
three developing countries to the permanent membership of the 
Security Council; one Asian, one African and one Latin American. 
This concept has been described as the “two plus three” proposal 
and was created to attain a certain balance between developed and 
developing countries within the permanent membership. 
Developing countries had mixed responses about the addition of 
Germany and Japan to permanent five. Smaller countries were 
generally less disturbed by possible changes within the group of 
leading military and economic powers, which they can not count 
themselves as but yet and still this group can have a major impact 
on threats to international peace and security within their regions. 
Pakistan declared that “centres of privileges within the UN 
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system” are “anachronistic, anti-democratic, and contrary to the 
spirit of sovereign equality as enshrined in the UN Charter.”61 
The General Assembly established an Open Ended Working Group 
(OEWG) on December 3, 1993. In the resolution preamble, the 
Assembly recognized the need to review the membership of the 
Security Council and related matters in view of the substantial 
increase in the membership of the United Nations, especially of 
developing countries, as well as the changes in international 
relations. It also pointed to the need to enhance the efficiency of 
the Council by creating OEWG to consider all aspects of the 
question of increase in the membership of the Security Council for 
equitable representation.62 The working group adopted a program 
organizing the questions to be considered in two so called clusters; 
first, questions of membership of the Council, including regional 
distribution, categories of membership, numbers and modalities of 
selection. Second; other matters related to the Council such as 
working methods and procedures were to be reviewed. 
Participation in the working group was open to all member states. 
The working group was created as an initial forum to discuss the 
possibility of the expansion of the Council but it did not speak of 
the permanent membership specifically.  The idea of creating a 
third category of members of the Security Council which would 
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enjoy a “better” status than the nonpermanent members but not the 
privileges of the permanent members found substantial support 
during meetings of OEWP. Mid-sized states that believe their 
chances of becoming a permanent member may be inconceivable 
see the third category as a possibility of being represented in the 
Council more equally. There have been debates over what the third 
category would be and how they would be chosen. The 
Organization of African Unity, now the African Union, suggested 
that members of the Security Council should be elected according 
to the principle of equitable geographical representation. They 
declared that Africa should be entitled to two permanent seats, to 
be occupied on a rotating basis. In their proposal, they expressed 
their support for the Asian and Latin American countries to have 
two seats respectively as well. These seats, “permanent regional 
rotating seats shall rotate among members of the respective 
regional group, according to criteria established by the region with 
membership in the Council still governed by the rules of the 
Charter. The country which occupies the seat would have to enjoy 
the right of the veto and would be required to consult with other 
states in that region before exercising it. The states shall be 
designated by the region for a period of approximately four to six 
years, with the possibility of immediate reelection and be elected 
by the General Assembly. This proposal seems to be based on the 
 68
idea of lifting the ban on immediate reelection of non permanent 
members as stated in the Charter. This would give the rotating 
members an opportunity to establish a presence within the Council 
as the P5 have done over the last 66 years.  
Another important issue on the able for reform is that of the right 
of the veto. When the United Nations was first created, the smaller 
countries debated this seemingly divisive and discriminatory 
practice. As it so happens, the veto was abused during the Cold 
War. In more recent times, it hasn’t been used as often but it is still 
seen as a privilege experienced by a select few. There have been 
proposals to totally due away with the veto as well as proposals to 
modify its usage within the Charter. Like countries of the 
nonaligned movement, the African states thought the veto was an 
antidemocratic practice and wished it would be eliminated. One 
proposal that calls for the veto to be limited in scope suggests that 
the veto should only be used decisions made invoke the authority 
of Chapter VII. Another proposal would restrict a single member’s 
power to prevent the Council from adopting a resolution. It has 
also been suggested that the single veto by a member can be 
overturned either by the members of the General Assembly or by a 
majority decision in the Security Council.63   
There are only a handful of members within the United Nations 
that support the right of the veto. Among them are the current 
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members of the permanent five as well as those states aspiring to 
one day become a part of the exclusive club. Australia believed 
that the veto should not be extended to additional members of a 
permanent group but has acknowledged its value as a last resort to 
safeguard the national interests of the strongest players in the 
system of collective security. This will ensure that they have a 
stronger stake in acting within the system than outside of it. 
Singapore believed that without it the great powers would not 
consent to put their power at the disposal of a sheer majority of the 
implementation of decisions which they may not agree with. 
Without the support of the great powers the UN is prevented from 
undertaking commitments that it lacks the power to fulfill.64  
Change in the Council will not be easy and it will take the support 
of the P-5. The Open Ended Working Group on Council reform 
has been working for almost 20 years with no apparent progress. 
Competing national interests has served as a gridlock to any real 
reform. Aspiring states are usually blocked by neighboring states 
that feel there power position would be compromised by new 
additions to the Council. The P-5 have been able to block any 
changes that would challenge or diminish their authority. The P-5 
will only be able to do this as long as the elected members of the 
Council, as well as the members of the United Nations feel that 
their power and presence are still legitimate. The source of strength 
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for the Council, particularly the P-5 comes from the willingness of 
the member nations to abide by the resolutions passed. The 
Council exists as an institution within the greater United Nations, 
created by the ratification of the Charter. To preserve legitimacy, 
the Council must continue to meet the expectations of the UN 
community. If the needs and concerns of the member nations are 
not met, the Council will lose its legitimacy and member states will 

















The Current Division within the Security Council 
“The presence of permanent members in an institution is in itself a 
decisive advantage. It implies an almost perfect mastery of issues, 
procedures, and practices and even of what is not said. When that 
permanent membership is accompanied by a particularly favorable 
relationship of power, there is a tendency to take advantage of that 
position to advance one’s views and interests, sometimes to the 
detriment of mission of general interest that led to the 
establishment of the institution in the first place. Despite 
appearances, there is a pattern of behavior that is shared by the 
members of the Council, who, willingly or not, are often tempted 
to believe that agreement between five is the same as agreement 
between 15. The Security Council would benefit from returning to 
its initial composition. It is composed of 15 members, but little by 
little, it is becoming a body of five plus 10 members. That 
dichotomy can only affect the transparency and the legitimacy to 
which we all aspire.”65                     
Ambassador Martin Chungong Ayafor of Cameroon, 2002 
 In 1963 the General Assembly passed resolution 1991. This 
resolution dealt with the increase in the membership of the United 
Nations and questioned how equitable the Security Council 
membership was at the time. When the United Nations was first 
founded, the Security Council only had a membership of 11. In 
accordance with Article 108 of the charter which allows for 
amendments, the number of the Security Council was increased 
from 11 to 15 members. Two of the four additional non permanent 
members were only to serve one year terms. The remaining eight 
                                                 
65 Mahbubani p. 253 
 72
non permanent members would serve two year terms. The ten non 
permanent members were to be elected according to the following 
pattern: Five from African/Asian States; One from Eastern 
European States; Two from Latin American States; and Two from 
European and other States.66  
 The division between the permanent five members and the 
elected ten members was not evident until the end of the Cold War. 
During the Cold War, the permanent five members were divided 
therefore the Council as a whole were paralyzed. The United States 
and Soviet Union used their veto power as a propaganda tool 
during this time and many resolutions were not passed. Once the 
Cold War ended, the permanent five members acted more in 
accordance with each other but not always with the elected ten. In 
Practice, the P-5 have been given power without responsibility and 
the E-10 have been given responsibility without power. In recent 
years, there has been a growing sentiment among the UN members 
that the states elected to the Security Council have been left out of 
the decision making process on certain issues, most prominently 
with respect to Iraq67 Elected members are not given enough time 
in the Security Council to have pull or influence, especially states 
elected for one year terms.  
                                                 
66 General Assembly Resolution 1991 
67 Mahubabani p.256 
 73
  The E-10 are at an extreme disadvantage in deliberations 
and decision making within the Security Council. In terms of 
national power, the P-5 are stronger than most elected members. In 
peace and security issues, the P-5 are the only five legitimate 
nuclear powers. Within the P-5 there is also a hierarchy. The 
United States is known as the P-1 reflecting the unique unipolar 
moment in the current international community. Following the 
United States in the power struggle within the Council are Russian 
and China. Although countries such as Germany and Japan have 
stronger economies, when elected to the Security Council, there is 
no change in the domination of the P-5. France and the United 
Kingdom are the most active members of the Security Council. 
Their level of involvement to lead and implement foreign policy 
far from their borders can be a reflection of how France and the 
United Kingdom have historically influenced world politics. Some 
believe that there time has passed as leaders of the “free world” 
and their heightened level of activity acts as some validation for 
them to remain current members of the permanent five. This comes 
at a time when many question the justification of the continuance 
of the victors of World War II to still hold seats as permanent 
members, nearly seven decades later.  
 The veto power has always been at the top of debate over 
equality within the Council. The P-5 have exercised the veto less 
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and less over in recent years. The limited use of the veto by the P-5 
has raised the question of whether or not this right is still needed. 
Although the formal use of the veto in the open meeting are now 
rare, the more powerful members, such as the United States are 
still using it in an implied manner in closed consultations. 
Meaning, issues that would be veto don’t even reach the table, 
therefore giving the appearance that the members of the Council 
are more in agreement when in face it is quite the opposite. Despite 
the Charter provision stating that the veto should not be used for 
procedural issues, in November 2002 the U.S. delegation blocked 
the procedural proposal for dialogue between the Security Council 
and the president of the International Court of Justice, even though 
a majority of the Council was in favor of doing so. The P-5 have 
given themselves the advantage of using the veto in closed door 
consultations. The increase in the number of formal and informal 
meetings since the end of the Cold War shows a spike in activity. 
The increase in the number of informal meetings shows a tendency 
for the Council to have private debates on relevant issues before 
actually going public. The charts located in the appendix show the 
number of formal meetings in comparison to informal 
consultations over the last twenty-two years. 
The P-5 have also refused any effort to remove the word 
“provisional” from the Charter when dealing with procedural 
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matters. Efforts from representatives from member states have met 
with a lot of resistance. When Kishore Mahbubani served on the 
Council as a representative for Singapore, he notes that the other 
E-10 were puzzled by the fact that the P-5 did not welcome their 
ideas of reform and expressed their surprise that the “tourists” were 
trying to change the arrangements of the Council. He further stated 
that the P-5 made it clear that they believe the E-10 should make 
no claim of co-ownership in the Council. 68  
 There is no question that the members of the P-5 have 
seniority within the Security Council. With seniority comes 
experience and power. When new members are elected to the 
Security Council for their two or one year term, they find it very 
difficult to bring up items on agendas that the previous members 
and the P-5 have already discussed and decided how it would be 
handled. There is a belief that trade-offs have occurred over the 
years on issues that appear long standing with no clear end in sight. 
For example, the issues in Cyprus and Georgia have received 
attention from the Council for some time. Countless numbers of 
resolutions have been passed but the situation has remained 
ongoing.  
 Precedents are set by the P-5 of the Council and the E-10 
are at a severe disadvantage when trying decipher the “norm.” 
There are no records of the closed door meetings that have gone on 
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over the years. Only the P-5 who have a continuous membership in 
the Council have the actual memory and know the history of the 
Council. The Council often works on set precedents that are 
derived from the memory of procedures over the years. In this 
respect it has become somewhat of a fraternity where there are 
some things done in secrecy without the knowledge of the whole 
and it is difficult to gain information unless you are a part of the 
club.  
 There are a few departments under the Secretariat that are 
privy to the history of the Council and its inner workings. The 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations monitors Council 
deliberations on their mandated operations. The Department of 
Political Affairs also follows issues specific to their mandate. 
These departments could provide the valuable information needed 
by the E-10 so that they may better serve their term but such a task 
would be time consuming and costly. The advantage of some of 
the departments having access to inside information comes at some 
cost, unfortunately to the disadvantage of the E-10. At times, the P-
5 members insist on seeing a draft Secretariat report before it is 
shared with the elected members of the Council. Once again, the P-
5 taking advantage of their seniority status making it evident that 
the playing feel is not at all level within the Council.69  
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The Security Council and International Relations Theory 
 When evaluating the Security Council from a realist 
perspective, it is evident that the permanent five members often 
times take a realist approach in how they handle their involvement 
in affairs. Realism is based on the notion that states are the 
principal or most important actors. To realists, states are the key 
unit of analysis. The veto power given to the five states in Security 
Council supports this premise. Realists also emphasize that the 
state is a unitary actor where the government of the state speaks 
with one voice for the state as whole. This state acts rationally, 
making decisions in the best interest of the state with its own 
national security at the top of its list.70  
 During the Cold War, the permanent five members of the 
Security Council were divided due to ideological and political 
differences. Many of the issues that were vetoed or not seized by 
the Security Council were because some members of the P-5 felt 
they would have affected the national security of their state. For 
example, the expansion of communism and more recently after the 
end of the Cold War, the NATO intervention within Kosovo 
impeding on the borders of Russia. Even the 2003 Iraqi invasion is 
seen as a fundamentally realist reaction to a state that feared its 
national security was threatened, namely the United States and the 
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United Kingdom. The state, in this case, according to supporters of 
the 2003 Iraqi invasion, saw the state as acting rational, outside the 
scope of the United Nations. The U.S. led invasion of Iraq can be 
considered a hegemonic in which survival is achieved through 
relative alliance and military capability. In this type of war, force is 
seen as a necessary tool to preserve the system. 71 
 The theory of pluralism/liberalism, focuses on the 
participation of non-state actors such as NATO. Pluralists believe 
that non-state actors are important entities in world politics. 
Pluralists believe that the state is not a unitary actor. It is composed 
of competing individuals, interest groups and bureaucracies.72 The 
G8 can be considered an example of a pluralistic entity. Without 
the meeting of the G8, it may have taken the Security Council 
longer to reach a favorable outcome in Kosovo.  
Constructivism has several approaches as a theory. In rule-
orientated constructivism, the structures of the governing world 
politics are primarily social rather than material and the 
communicatively rational agents use speech acts to construct the 
social rules governing world politics. The social construction of 
world politics and identities serves as the main focus. Actors in 
international politics make decisions based upon what the world 
appears to be and how they conceive their roles in it. It is clear that 
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within the Security Council, the permanent five members perceive 
themselves to be the super powers charged with the maintenance of 
international peace and security. The founders of the United 
Nations believed that unanimity was a key piece in order to 
execute their mandate. The smaller states did not agree that the 
veto power encouraged equality within the United Nations but they 
ultimately ratified the UN Charter. Concepts such as sovereignty 
and equality are social constructions that help shape the identities 
and interests of international actors.73 Hence social constructivists 
argue that the realist assumption of egotistic identities and treating 
state interests as givens is questionable, especially when it comes 
to the greater support within the United Nations for the veto power. 
Over time, rule-governed cooperation can lead actors to change 
their beliefs about who they are and how they relate to the rest of 
international system, hence, the bid for Germany and Japan to 
become a part of the permanent five when just seven decades prior, 
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The Security Council in the New Millennium 
 In the Annual Report to the General Assembly, the Security 
Council described the year ending July 2002 as one of the busiest 
times in its history. The attacks on the United States, September 
11, 2001, prompted the immediate passing of resolution 1368 on 
September 12 which condemned the terrorist acts in the United 
States and labeled it as a threat to international peace and security. 
The resolution called on all member states to work urgently to 
bring forth the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the terrorist 
acts and stressed that those responsible for aiding, supporting or 
harboring the perpetrators would also be held accountable.  
Resolution 1373 passed just two weeks later, created the Counter-
Terrorism Committee, whose mandate was to bolster the ability of 
the United Nations member states to prevent terrorist acts within 
their borders and across their regions. The resolution also called 
for the freezing of any funds that may be available to those 
involved in terrorist acts.  Afghanistan which had been low on the 
priority list, immediately became a key focal points in the fight 
against terrorism when it was learned that the current government, 
the Taliban had ties to those involved in the terror attacks. In 2002, 
President George W. Bush issued the new National Security 
Strategy which outlined what the United States perceived as 
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challenges to the international community in the new millennium.  
It stated, “America is now threatened less by conquering states 
than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and 
armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the 
embittered few.”74 
 The National Security Strategy document also went in to 
the role of the Security Council and the importance to remain 
engaged in critical regional disputes to avoid explosive escalation 
and to minimize human suffering. The United States also 
acknowledged that no doctrine could anticipate all of the 
circumstances that might warrant U.S. action. Believing that more 
can be done when acting with others than when acting alone, the 
United States also stressed the importance of consent and 
cooperation of the parties otherwise the international community 
would have little role to play. Rogue states and their threat to 
international peace and security was an important part of the 
doctrine because within this, the United States laid the groundwork 
for their future policy in Iraq in 2003. It states that such states 
brutalize their own people, have no regards for international law, 
seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction, sponsor terrorism and 
reject basic human values. The United States felt that they must be 
prepared to stop these rogue states before they are able to threaten 
the United States, their allies and friends. The document also 
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makes reference to international law, stating that nations need not 
suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend 
themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of 
attack. 75 
 The United States attempted to use coercive diplomacy 
with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan when it learned that the 
terrorist attacks were headed by Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda 
network. The U.S. demanded that the Taliban turn over bin Laden 
for trial and threatened military attack if it did not, and backed up 
its threat by the movement of heavy bombers and other forces to 
within striking distance of Afghanistan. When the Taliban failed to 
comply, the United States took action and overthrew the Taliban.76  
Resolution 1378 passed by the Security Council in November 
2001, showed the Council’s support in rooting out terrorism within 
Afghanistan. The Council made no direct reference to the U.S. led 
invasion of Afghanistan directly but only made general references 
to all member nations to support the areas the safety and control of 
Afghan territories no longer under the control of the Taliban. The 
invasion of Afghanistan was never directly authorized by the 
Security Council; however resolution 1386 created the 
International Security Assistance Force to provide a secure 
environment for the political and economic reconstruction of 
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Afghanistan. This silence of the Security Council concerning the 
war in Afghanistan can be attributed to the fact that as a permanent 
member of the Security Council, the United States had the power 
to halt any resolutions that would have condemned them taking 
military action. Due to the solidarity among member states of the 
United Nations with regards to the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001, it was unlikely that anyone would challenge the United 
State’s action but the response to the U.S. led invasion of Iraq less 
than two years later was much different.  
 After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991, the Security 
Council adopted resolution 687 which called for the destruction of 
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. The United States also 
requested that Iraq’s nuclear program be placed under the control 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). . Along with 
the requirements of resolutions 707 and 715, Iraq was required to 
declare the location, amounts and types of all its prohibited 
weapons; agree to destroy, remove or render them harmless under 
international supervision; agree to on site inspections and allow 
international inspectors immediate, unconditional and unrestricted 
access to areas, facilities, equipment, records and Iraqi officials; 
and undertake not to use develop, construct or acquire these 
prohibited items. The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) was 
established by the Council to deal with biological, chemical and 
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missile weapons. The IAEA was to verify Iraq’s declarations; 
destroy or supervise the destruction of the prohibited items; and 
establish and run an ongoing monitoring and verification system 
aimed at ensuring that Iraq does not reconstitute the prohibited 
programs.77  
 Iraq failed to fully comply with the resolutions and for 
years made the search and inspection difficult for IAEA and 
UNSCOM. Iraq produced a series of declarations that proved to be 
incomplete and insincere. Iraq hid the existence of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Programs and many sites and documentation 
with information on the sites. Iraq destroyed prohibited items, 
moved equipment and materials subject to monitoring and 
tampered with monitoring devices. Iraq also put up numerous 
obstacles, never granting full access to IAEA and UNSCOM as 
required by the Security Council. In response the Council 
condemned Iraq’s failure to fully comply with the resolutions.  
 In its defense, Iraq complained that the resolutions 
infringed upon its right as a sovereign state and threatened its 
national security. The Council had a difficult choice but eventually 
decided to attempt to restructure the current inspections program. 
Although the Council considered and were sensitive Iraq’s 
complaints, Iraq still failed to comply fully with the resolutions. 
The difficulties faced by IAEA and UNSCOM culminated from 
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1997-98. There was a growing mistrust between Iraq and the 
United Nations. Iraq decided to discontinue its cooperation with 
the IAEA and UNSCOM July 1998. Force, not authorized by the 
Security Council, was used by the United States and the United 
Kingdom in Iraq December 1998. The main objective of Operation 
Desert Fox which only lasted four days was to destroy targets 
linked with WMD capabilities and to force Iraq to yield to the 
Council’s demands. As a result of the strikes, Iraq refused the 
return of any inspectors and cut of all cooperation with the UN. 
 In attempts to reengage Iraq in the inspections program, 
The Security Council created a new body, the UN Monitoring, 
Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) under 
resolution 1284. The recruitment, status, training, and behavior of 
its personnel were to be consistent with the UN standards and rules 
of impartiality and professionalism. The Council also debated 
whether or not to lift some of the sanctions against to Iraq in order 
to gain some leverage and have them allow the new organization in 
to resume inspections. Resolution 687 demanded the complete 
disarmament as a condition for lifting the oil embargo against Iraq. 
This proved to be difficult; therefore 1284 took this challenge in to 
consideration and offered an intermediary stage with the 
suspension only when key remaining disarmament tasks were dealt 
with. The United States and the United Kingdom demanded the 
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completion of these tasks whereas China, France and Russia were 
a bit more lenient in demanding progress in the completion of the 
requirements. The division within the P-5 was also attributed the 
operational and financial measures used to complete the tasks 
within Iraq. Due to the lack of clarity, France, China and Russia 
failed to give their support to resolution 1284 and abstained when 
it came time to vote on its passage.  
 Iraq, convinced that the sanctions would not be lifted, 
rejected resolution 1284. The government also believed that the 
ultimate goal of the United States was to oust Saddam Hussein out 
of power. Iraq chose to have sanctions set against them without 
inspections. Iraq also interpreted the division within the Security 
Council as a sign of lack of determination in the Council to 
implement its new decision. Russia and France attempted to make 
clarifications on the modality of the suspension of sanctions 
whereas the United States demanded the inspectors return before 
modalities would be considered. Iraq did not allow inspectors 
return until November 2002, almost two years after the creation of 
UNMOVIC. During this time period, the United States made 
several attempts to force Iraqi compliance. This included the 
continued strikes by the U.S. and the UK in the no fly zones and 
the introduction of “smart sanctions.” Smart sanctions were to deal 
with the negative impact the sanctions were having on the Iraqi 
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civilians. The U.S. also sought to gain better control of Iraq’s 
borders to deter the smuggling of banned items. This was met with 
resistance by Iraq’s neighboring countries who wanted no part due 
to their own economic interests and vulnerability.  
 Iraq saw the division within the Security Council, 
specifically among the permanent five members, as an opportunity 
to defy the resolutions set forth by the Security Council. If the 
great powers couldn’t agree on a solution to the situation within 
Iraq, Saddam Hussein felt, Iraq’s compliance was not necessary 
and he was able to circumvent the authority of the Council. The 
climate changed however after the United States put regime 
change within Iraq at the top of its foreign policy agenda in the 
beginning of 2002. After the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the 
U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan to take the Taliban out of power, 
a different perception of how to deal with threats to international 
peace and security began to take shape in the United States. As 
stated earlier, the Security Council made no mention in any 
resolution regarding the invasion of Afghanistan therefore setting 
the precedent that it would go along with what the United States 
believed to be legitimate foreign intervention tactics in the interest 
of national security. The Security Council did not agree with 
regime change as an option in getting Iraq to comply with its 
resolutions; however the threatening stance made by the United 
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States did prompt the Iraqi government to resume talks with the 
United Nations in March 2002.  
 Talks between Iraq and the United States went on for 
months in 2002; however, the inspectors of IAEA and UNMOVIC 
were still not permitted within the territory. Frustrated with the 
lack of Iraq’s cooperation, President George W. Bush of the United 
States in a speech given at the United Nations on September 12, 
2002, warned Iraq that if they did not want to be peacefully 
disarmed, other means would be used in order to uphold the 
objectives of the Security Council to secure international peace and 
security. Soon thereafter, Iraq admitted the immediate and 
unconditional return of the inspectors.78 
 Over the next, five months following the resumption of the 
inspections, the permanent five members of the Security Council 
were still in disagreement on how the process should be handled. 
Resolution 1441 passed in November 2002, shifted the goals and 
methods emphasized by 1284. Resolution 1441 required Iraq to 
provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, 
unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all, including 
underground areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records and 
means of transport which they wish to inspect. The resolution also 
laid out the requirements under which the IAEA and UNMOVIC 
were to operate within Iraq and it gave them a wide range of 
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liberties to conduct their inspections with all resources necessary to 
successfully complete their task. The Security Council called for 
the immediate compliance with this resolution and reserved the 
right to intervene immediately should reports on noncompliance 
surface from the inspectors. Most ambiguous among the sections 
of the resolution, paragraph 13 called for serious consequences for 
Iraq if it continued violations of its obligations. Without the 
specific outline of what the serious consequence may be, The 
United States and United Kingdom were able to use this to their 
advantage. Resolution 1441 was passed unanimously by the 
Council.79  
 The archived videos of the Security Council meetings 
leading up to the U.S. led invasion of Iraq shows a stark division 
among the permanent five. The United Kingdom’s representative 
to the Council stating his dissatisfaction with the progress in Iraq. 
He further stated that it was quite clear that the situation would not 
be resolved peacefully. In an open meeting held by the Security 
Council, the UN Ambassador from South Africa asked for patience 
from the United States and the United Kingdom, reminding them 
that it took two years for inspectors to be satisfied when similar 
inspections were conducted within South Africa. The South 
African ambassador further stressed that war in Iraq would have a 
negative impact on the world economy by causing an increase in 
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the price of oil. The inspectors had only been working inside Iraq 
for 60 days by January 27, 2003. The members of the non-aligned 
movement requested that the inspectors be allowed to do their 
work and that war should not be an option at this time.80  
 On February 14, 2003, UN inspectors Dr. Hans Blix and 
Dr. Mohammed El Baradei went before the Security Council to 
share their findings and update the members on the progress in 
Iraq. Dr. Blix stated that access was provided promptly and 
inspections had taken place throughout Iraq at industrial sites, 
ammunition deposits, universities, presidential sites, mobile 
laboratories, private houses, missile production facilities, military 
camps and agricultural sites. He stated that access to the sites have 
so far been without problem. Iraq had also accepted an offer by 
South Africa for further talks on how South Africa gained the trust 
of the world by disarmament, a process that took two years.81  
 Dr. El Baradei of the IAEA stated that since his last report 
on January 27, 2003, they have conducted thirty-eight inspections 
at nineteen locations, for a total of 177 inspections at a total of 125 
locations. He stated that Iraq has continued to provide immediate 
access to all locations. El Baradei stressed that the inspections 
were ongoing and that time must be given to re-familiarize 
themselves with known locations to ensure that has nothing has 




taken place since the last inspections in 1998. They were also in 
the process of collecting water and land samples to ensure that they 
have not been exposed to radiation or have any traces of biological 
weapons.  Interviews were being conducted of key Iraqi officials 
and without the interference of the government as stressed in 
resolution 1441. El Baradei also obtained documentation of 
attempts made by Iraq to obtain materials during the absence of the 
inspectors between 1998 and 2002. His report did not contain any 
indication that the Iraqi government were not complying with their 
requests.82 
 At the same meeting U.S. Secretary of Defense Colin 
Powell argued that Iraq had failed to comply and that resolution 
1441 was not about inspections but about disarmament. Powell felt 
that Iraq wasn’t being fully open and that there were too many 
weapons that aren’t accounted for. He stated that he believes force 
is a last resort but Iraq has not shown that it is willing to be open 
with the international community. He feared that if the weapons 
fell in to the hands of terrorists, tens of thousands of people could 
lose their lives.83  
 China believed that the inspection process was working and 
more time should be given to carry out resolution 1441. China 
hoped the issue could be resolved within the political framework of 




the United Nations. China believed that the Security Council 
should resolve this within the Charter of the United Nations and 
ensure international peace and security. China was an advocate of 
a peaceful solution and wanted to take all possible measures to 
avert war. China made a point in striving to live up to the trust the 
people around the world have placed in the Security Council.  
 In response to the inspections and the call for force by the 
United States and Britain, Russia wanted to see continued support 
of the inspection. The Russian Security Council representative 
wanted to rely on the professional opinion of the inspectors to help 
them come to a conclusion about Iraq’s compliance. Russia 
stressed that they could not ignore the movement in the right 
direction by Iraq since the last meeting on February 5, 2003. It was 
evident that Iraq had made progress by forming commissions and 
cooperating with Blix and El Baradei. Russia believed that force 
should only be used when all other options had been exhausted and 
that there was no immediate indication that this was the case.  
The United Kingdom was in agreement with the United States, 
stating that Iraq was not being fully honest about their WMD 
program. They reminded the meeting attendees that Iraq had 
launched missile attacks on five of its neighbors, invaded Iran and 
Kuwait and the Hussein regime was responsible for the killing of 
innocent people inside Iraq, Iran and Kuwait. Hussein’s son-in-law 
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was said to have a biological weapons program with 1000 tons of 
chemical weapons which were currently unaccounted for. The UK 
believed that the twelve years since the passing of resolution of 
687, has been a humiliating and embarrassing period for the 
Security Council. The representative stated that Iraq has defied 
requests for disarmament and kicked inspectors out of the country 
in 1998. They stressed that force should be used if noncompliance 
continues because if other countries around the globe see that Iraq 
was able to defy the United Nations, they will do so as well.   
 France thought the disarmament should happen through the 
inspections. They didn’t believe the United Nations was hitting a 
dead end inside Iraq and believed that all options for the inspectors 
had not been fully explored. France emphasized that the use of 
force would be bad for the region. The inspections were providing 
results and war would be the sanction of failure. Premature 
military intervention would bring the unity of the Security Council 
in to question. France also noted that based on their intelligence, 
there were no links between Baghdad and al Qaeda. An invasion in 
Iraq would only nurture division and nurture terrorism. France was 
firm on their stance that nothing in this Council would be done in 
haste.84 
 In a Security Council meeting held on February 18, 2003, 
an Iraqi representative was invited to speak and bring his concerns 
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to the president of the Council. In his opening statement he 
mentioned the continued attempts by the United States and Britain 
to launch an aggressive war against his country which has been 
subject to an unjust and incomprehensive embargo for over 12 
years. He stated that their aim was to change the national 
government in Iraq and to impose American hegemony upon the 
region and its resources as a first step towards world domination 
through the use of force. This, the representative stressed was a 
dangerous precedent in international relations that threatened the 
credibility of the United Nations and exposes international and 
regional peace to great dangers. He also complained of Operation 
Desert Fox led by the United States in 1998 which destroyed Iraqi 
infrastructures and killed thousands of Iraqis. This act of 
aggression, reminded the representative, was not endorsed by the 
Security Council and was a dark day in the history of the United 
Nations. Further he stated, Iraq has had a history of complying 
with the resolutions but did not agree with the political agenda of 
the United States.  He asked the Security Council to perform as the 
UN Charter asks, in a peaceful matter and not to let the United 
States and Britain attack his country. In conclusion, he asked for 
the lifting of the embargos which had already cost Iraq the lives of 
2 million people.85   
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 Unfortunately the requests for more patience with the 
inspection process were not heeded by the United States and 
Britain. The United States did not gain the support of the Security 
Council but decided to act without the consent of the international 
community. On March 17, 2003 the U.S. and UK withdrew drafts 
that would have given Iraq one last chance to disarm and decided 
to take military action solely on the basis of Resolutions 1441, 687 
and 678.86  
 The U.S. and the UK failed to abide by the fundamental 
rules of collective security and in doing so they alienated 
themselves from the international community. Central to a 
collective security concept is a binding obligation to defend a 
particular status quo against forceful change. Traditionally, sound 
governance motivates reliance on peaceful change by punishing 
efforts at violent change. Collective security can succeed only if it 
operates in a context where peaceful alternatives exist for the 
advancement of competing values. If this is not in place, the idea 
of collective security will remain more illusory than real.87  
 The actions taken by the United States against Iraq were 
not seen as legitimate in the eyes of their colleagues. In “The 
Sources of American Legitimacy”, an essay written for Foreign 
Affairs Magazine following the months after the Iraq invasion, the 
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question of how the United States was to recover from such a 
blunder was questioned. The article stated,  
“Legitimacy arises from the conviction that state action proceeds 
within the ambit of law, in two senses: first, that action issues from 
rightful authority, that is, from the political institution authorized 
to take it; and second, that it does not violate a legal or moral 
norm. Ultimately, however, legitimacy is rooted in opinion, and 
thus actions that are unlawful in either of these senses may, in 
principle, still be deemed legitimate. That is why it is an elusive 
quality.” 88 
The United States for the first time had widespread public 
discontent for their approach in handling Iraq. In the past, the U.S. 
had been able to garner some support for its policies but at this 
time, members of the Security Council opposed to the war in Iraq 
now feared U.S. dominance and defiance of the Council. Realist 
international relations theorists expect that others will eventually 
ally against the United States in order to curb its power. They 
argue that a unipolar system is inherently unstable for two reasons: 
(1) the dominant state will take on so many tasks that it will 
eventually weaken; and (2) the dominant state is unrestrained and 
thus threatening to others.  Although, members of the Security 
Council have grown weary of the United States they have not 
increased military spending in order to compete with U.S. 
dominance. Other tactics have been taken such as the lack of 
support for the U.S. led military invasion of Iraq. Even when the 
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Saddam Hussein regime was overthrown, the United States found 
it difficult to finance the war and the recovery without its usually 
key allies. Tools such as the veto are also being used to keep U.S. 
dominance in check inside of the Council. The United States wants 
global rules to deal with transnational threats but in the case of Iraq 
has exempted itself from what has become the accepted norm in 
the international community. The United States has done this by: 
(1) asserting that certain rules do not apply to its own policies, (2) 
using force without Security Council authorization; (3) claiming 
exclusive rights to preemption beyond all previously understood 
notions of self defense; (4) claiming that humanitarian intervention 
is justifiable when carried out by democratic states; (5) advocating 
sanctions as punitive measures rather than bargaining tools; and (6) 
advocating harsh policies of isolation and regime change for 
“rogue states” rather than engagement. With these policies the 
United States potentially pursues so much hierarchy that it could 
discourage others from complying with the global rules that 






                                                 
89 Frederking p. 20 
 98
Conclusion 
 The Security Council’s job of maintaining international 
peace and security was subject to a complicated history in 
international relations. Unforeseen circumstances developed 
shortly after the creation of the United Nations, which inhibited the 
permanent members and their ability to respond to international 
crises objectively as mandated in the UN Charter. During the Cold 
War, the Korean War and the Namibian struggle for independence 
were directly affected by the struggles between the Soviet Union 
and the United States. It appeared as though the two superpowers 
may, at times, have been more interested in promoting their 
ideological beliefs and protecting their economic interests rather 
than acting in the best interest of the people in crisis.  
 The Suez Canal crisis touched on a time prior to the 
creation of the United Nations, stemming back to when Egypt was 
under the protection of the United Kingdom. French and British 
interests were made evident as they looked to take back the Suez 
Canal militarily with the help of Israel. Attempts to stop the 
military action within Egypt by the members states of the United 
Nations were thwarted by the permanent members of the Security 
Council involved in the crisis. This case study shows how one of 
the members of the Security Council can blatantly defy any 
 99
counteraction by the UN if they feel as though their actions are 
within the interests of their own national security.  
During the final years of the Cold War, it appeared as though the 
Security Council was finally working as mandated in the Charter. 
They showed a unified front when faced with threats to 
international peace and security in Iraq and took the humanitarian 
approach with their intervention in El Salvador. One of the biggest 
failures in the history of the Security Council was the Rwandan 
case. Due to an unfavorable outcome of the United States’ 
involvement in Somalia, they were hesitant to take on another 
conflict which seemed internal especially where they could be 
taking a military and financial blow. There were still questions of 
ulterior political motives within each of these cases. More recently, 
many question the acts of the United States and its allies. Was the 
swift response to the Iraqi invasion due a blatant violation of the 
UN Charter or was it because the nation invaded, Kuwait, played a 
vital role in the UN member nations’ economy? The crisis in 
Rwanda did not directly affect the national security of any of the 
members of the P-5 therefore making it low on their agenda. Had 
there been an African representative on the Security Council, there 
would have been more incentive to become actively involved in 
Rwanda but the lack of representation played a key rule in the 
disinterest of the Council.  
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 The crisis in Kosovo and Bosnia challenged the capacity at 
which the Security Council could be effectively involved in a 
conflict. China felt that the issues in these territories should not be 
seized by the Security Council because the people in the areas 
should practice self determination. The United States did not want 
to become militarily involved due to financial restraints. As time 
passed, it was ultimately internal changes in the war that ultimately 
resulted in its ending. The involvement of the Security Council in 
Bosnia and NATO in Kosovo was not the ultimate deciding factor. 
Without the support of Russia, the situation in Kosovo continued. 
Only when Russia called for meetings outside of the Security 
Council could terms be agreed upon. This de facto consultation of 
the G8 shows how the powerful member nations can find a way of 
imposing their policies outside of the Security Council making it 
more difficult for the E-10 to have input.  
 Although the use of the veto power subsided over time, the 
P-5 were still able to control the activities of the Security Council 
in closed informal consultations where at times members of the E-
10 were excluded. Attempts to reform these actions have been met 
with opposition by the P-5, the General Assembly must take a 
firmer approach to the divisive actions of the P-5. In 2003, it 
appeared the power of the United States went unchecked by the 
Security Council and the United Nations as a whole with the 
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invasion of Iraq. Despite widespread disapproval, the United States 
used force to impose its will and the will of its few allies on Iraq.  
Many of these issues are debatable but the fact still remains that 
the UN Security Council has served as an extremely important 
forum in the international community. With each resolution 
passed, issues are brought to the forefront and are given a voice. 
Such as in Namibia whose people and freedom organizations relied 
heavily on the moral and political support of the General Assembly 
but as well as the declarations made by the Security Council that 
detested the inequality of South Africa’s policies. The Security 
Council will need to evolve and conform to the demands of the 
international community if it is to remain a legitimate source of the 
maintenance of international peace and security. It can only remain 
legitimate if the members of the P-5 do not go unchecked. A 
system of checks and balances needs to be installed to deter any 
future uses of force similar to the Iraqi case in 2003.  
A more representative permanent five membership needs to be 
achieved and established by the greater United Nations body. In 
order to establish a better balance of power, the permanent five 
members should be rotated every five years with at least one of the 
original permanent five holding a seat but not for more than five 
years at a time. This will encourage cooperation between the great 
powers and lesser powers, creating a more inclusive community 
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within the Council. The General Assembly, being the most 
representative body of the United Nations, should be responsible 
for voting on the permanent five members just as they do with the 
elected ten members. This will be difficult to implement without 
the total cooperation of the Security Council as it presently is. This 
necessary step for reform will put an end to what at times appears 
to be instances of dictatorship and power struggles within the 
Security Council 
 The P-5 have become too comfortable in their role and at times do 
not feel that their authority can be threatened. Member nations may 
disagree but their discontent will unlikely change the policy of the 
P-5 unless it comes from an equal military or economic power 
such as Japan or Germany. The only clear solution to dealing with 
the dominance of the P-5 is to have this group change periodically. 
The victors of World War II are still at the helm of the 
international community. This can only last as long as the 
international community believes they are still needed. As it 
stands, the P-5’s military and economic strength have kept them as 
the dominant powers. This dynamic can only be changed with the 
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